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The peer-reviewed journal Intergenerational Justice Review (IGJR) aims to improve our understanding of intergenerational justice and sustainable development through pure and applied ethical research. The IGJR (ISSN 2190-6335) seeks articles representing the state of the art in the philosophy, politics and law of intergenerational relations. It is an open-access journal that is published on a professional level with an extensive international readership. The editorial board comprises over 50 international experts from ten countries, representing eight disciplines. Published contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations (FRFG) or the Intergenerational Foundation (IF). Citations from articles are permitted upon accurate quotation and submission of one sample of the incorporated citation to FRFG or IF. All other rights are reserved.

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mong the many headlines that followed the 2018 mid-term elections in the United States, one stood out as very good news for political representation: the election of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Irrespective of one’s political leanings – Republican or Democrat – it is an extraordinary achievement for a 29-year-old woman and daughter to a Puerto Rican to be elected into the House of Representatives. Against a predominantly old, male, and white sitting Congress, her election means a step towards better representation of certain demographics in American policy-making processes.

Ocasio-Cortez represents a minority around the world, as younger people are notoriously underrepresented in political parties and trade unions – in fact, in political decision-making processes writ large. And this despite the fact that a 29-year-old will have to live a lot longer with the intended and unintended consequences of political decisions taken in 2018. In other words, while younger people are disproportionately affected by political decisions, they are at the same time heavily underrepresented in organisations and processes leading to the decisions.

The first prize of the Intergenerational Justice Prize 2017/18 was awarded to Mona Lena Krook and Mary K. Nugent who contribute to this debate by arguing that lowering the eligibility age to run for office leads to better representation of the youngest and next-youngest cohorts in parliament. Drawing on data from 144 countries and 192 parliaments, they first show that the average “waiting period” for citizens – defined as the difference between the legal voting age and the legal age for holding office – is 5.3 years. By combining these data with MPV ages from around the world, they are able to show a strong correlation between eligibility age and MPV ages. In their words, the results show that “the average impact of reducing the minimum age to stand for office from 25 to 18 would be to increase the proportion of MPs under 45 by over 5 percentage points”. Based on literature on women and young people in politics, the authors attribute these effects to the mobilising character of a lower age requirement. It allows citizens to compete in elections at a younger age and this increases the probability of younger people being represented in parliament. Aksel Sundström and Daniel Stockemer, also among the winners of the Intergenerational Justice Prize 2017/18, take a closer look at the age of parliamentarians and investigate which political parties can help to foster the election of young parliamentarians, and to what extent. After all, political parties act as gatekeepers because they are in control of the list of candidates running for election. Drawing on theories of party politics, the authors argue for five different factors that could possibly explain the share of young MPs: the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of party support, the party’s ideology, and the party’s formal recruitment procedure for candidates. In other words, the authors theorise that having a young network, a large outreach, and an ideology or organisational structure that attracts the young should increase a party’s share of young MPs. To test their hypotheses, the authors use data on over 6,000 Members of the European Parliament ever elected and match them with information on party characteristics. Rather surprisingly, their various statistical models show no noteworthy effect of any of the party characteristics on the representation of young MPs in the European Parliament, 1979-2019. Only parties with a more libertarian ideology, as opposed to an authoritarian ideology, are predicted to have somewhat younger MEPs. But the effects are small. This suggests that, irrespective of their individual features, there are hardly any noteworthy differences between parties’ ability to promote the election of young MPs. It follows that other parties may want to adopt other means to accomplish a better representation of the young; the authors’ suggestion of applying youth quotas within parties provides one potential avenue.

In the final article by the winners of this year’s Intergenerational Justice Prize, Thomas Tozer discusses the potential of quotas in his normative contribution on the representation of the young. He makes a case for the normative desirability of “descriptive representation” of the young within political parties and trade unions. Specifically, he argues that democracy requires the promoting of substantive equality and people’s substantive interests and that descriptive representation of the young can achieve both. This is because the young have unique concerns that are significant and because their concerns might be affected by representatives’ behaviour. Quotas that require parties and trade unions to enrol a certain share of young members, Tozer argues, might be an option but not ideal because people choose to become members of such organisations. As an alternative, he proposes the creation of incentives for young people to join parties and trade unions, such as free membership.

In the book review section, Emily Ford assesses Richard Katz and Peter Mair’s *Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties* (2018, OUP). The book’s central argument is that parties are developing or have already developed into cartels, driven by a desire to maintain their position in the face of declining political participation. They limit political competition between them and try to deter new party entry. Ford’s review overall is positive and she recommends the book to scholars and students as a discussion of the social pressures that parties are exposed to and how they are coping with them.

In a second book review, Anna Braam writes about Ian Gough’s *Heat, Greed and Human Need. Climate Change, Capitalism and Sustainable Wellbeing* (2017, Edward Elgar), a recent study which suggests three steps for countries to accomplish staying below a 1.5°C rise above pre-industrial temperatures: eco-efficient production, changing patterns of consumption, and a reduction of absolute consumption. According to Braam, the book’s interdisciplinary approach – drawing on economic, ecological, political and social aspects of climate change – is convincing, and the book’s argument is credible, especially regarding the rich countries.

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Antony Mason (IF) Jörg Tremain (University of Tübingen)  
Maria Lena Krook (FRFG) Markus Rutsche (University of St. Gallen)  
*Editors*
Not Too Young to Run?
Age requirements and young people in elected office
by Mona Lena Krook and Mary K. Nugent

Abstract: Promoting youth representation in parliaments is a growing global priority. To promote youth leadership and more inclusive politics, youth organizations in Nigeria mobilized successfully for a constitutional reform to lower the eligibility age to run for political office. In this paper, we draw on global data to assess whether lower eligibility ages will in fact lead to higher levels of youth participation. We find that lower age requirements positively affect the representation of the youngest and next youngest cohorts in parliament. We draw on qualitative interviews and gender literature to theorize that lower age limits have immediate and longer-term “mobilizing effects”, shifting the calculations of potential candidates in terms of the age at which they first decide to run for office.

Keywords: Youth, Young people, Politics, Parliament, Nigeria

Introduction
Enhancing opportunities for young people to participate in politics has become a growing global priority, with organizations like the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the United Nations (UN) seeking to collect data and develop strategies to elect a larger share of young people to national parliaments. One recommendation put forward by the IPU (2016: 16) is to align the ages at which citizens may vote in elections and run for political office. In line with this logic, a movement of young people in Nigeria launched a campaign in 2016 to reduce the age limit to stand as political candidates. Conceived by YIAGA Africa, a youth-based civil society organization seeking to promote good governance and youth political participation, the campaign soon encompassed more than 100 youth organizations and became known by its hashtag #NotTooYoungToRun. Inspired by this example, in late 2016 the UN Youth Envoy launched a global Not Too Young to Run campaign in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the IPU, YIAGA, and the European Youth Forum.

The #NotTooYoungToRun bill in Nigeria aimed to amend sections 65, 106, 131 and 177 of the Nigerian constitution to reduce the eligibility age for the Houses of Assembly and House of Representatives from 30 to 25 years old, the Senate and Governorship from 35 to 30 years old, and the office of the President from 40 to 35 years old. Sponsored by allies in the House of Representatives and the Senate, the bill passed both houses of parliament in July 2017. The proposed amendment was then presented to the 36 Houses of Assembly of the Nigerian states, 33 of which approved the bill (far exceeding the 24 states required for passage). In April 2018, the Senate sent the bill to the President for approval, who signed it — after further lobbying by youth organizations — into law on 31 May 2018. The final version reduced the age to run for President, the House of Representatives, and the state Houses of Assembly, but retained the existing age qualifications for Governors and Senators.

After the bill’s passage, the #NotTooYoungToRun campaign convened a press conference and declared that it marked “the beginning of a new era” in Nigerian politics. They argued that the reform would promote democratic development, deepen intergenerational dialogue and learning, reduce political violence and instability, and enhance competitive politics. They also emphasized the positive impact on the political rights of young people, pointing out that youth under the age of 35 formed 65% of the population and 53% of registered voters. They thanked all the elected officials who voted in favour of the bill, thereby demonstrating “unparalleled belief in youth leadership and inclusive politics” and “putting Nigeria on the global map as a country fully invested in meeting the needs of its youth”. They urged the “political class” — “if you want the youth vote” — to take active steps within their political parties to support the emergence of more young candidates (NotTooYoungToRun 2018a: 3).

Despite these arguments, it is not clear whether lower eligibility ages will necessarily lead to higher levels of youth representation. On the one hand, reforms may stimulate latent political ambition among youth, leading them to begin preparing political campaigns at earlier ages than they might have done prior to the legislative change. On the other hand, the new rules are permissive, not prescriptive: they allow younger people to come forward as aspirants for political office, but do not require political parties to actually nominate greater numbers of young people as political candidates. Given that young people around the world tend to eschew formal means of political participation, like voting and running for office, enacting such reforms may in fact have no effect on their political ambitions.

In this article, we explore these questions using quantitative and qualitative data and develop an original theory of “mobilizing effects” to explain how and why age eligibility reforms will, by and large increase levels of youth representation worldwide. Given the recent passage of the #NotTooYoungToRun bill, which will not apply until the next elections, we turn to global data to predict what may occur in terms of future youth representation in Nigeria. We begin in the first section by providing an overview of age eligibility requirements globally, finding that the vast majority of countries impose a “waiting time” — although this gap varies substantially across countries — between the voting age and the age required to run to become a member of parliament (MP). In the second section, we map justifications for imposing such a gap — as well as the considerations behind decisions to reduce it recently in a number of countries.
In the third section, we present descriptive statistics on youth representation worldwide and then perform a series of statistical analyses to determine the relationship between age eligibility requirements and the share of young parliamentarians. Our analysis reveals both “immediate” and “downstream” (longer-term) effects: lower age requirements positively affect the representation of the youngest cohort in parliament—but also, and even more strongly, positively influence the share of MPs in the next youngest cohort. This correlation holds even when controlling for other factors that might shape the proportion of young MPs, like the electoral system, age of the population, level of democracy, and how active young people are in civic and political life.

We theorize that younger age limits have “mobilizing effects,” shifting the calculations of potential candidates in terms of the age at which they first decide to run for office.

In the fourth section, we unpack these statistical relationships drawing on interviews with young MPs and activists, articles on the NotTooYoungToRun website, and the broadly scholarly literature on women and youth in politics. Based on these insights, we theorize that younger age limits have “mobilizing effects,” shifting the calculations of potential candidates in terms of the age at which they first decide to run for office. With a lower eligibility requirement, citizens can stand as candidates at a younger age. This opens up opportunities to run for higher offices, like parliament (an immediate effect). It can also increase the share of young people contesting lower-level offices, like local council seats, which lay the groundwork for contesting parliamentary elections in the future (a downstream effect). We conclude that rule changes can play a crucial role in signalling greater openness to youth participation, spurring their greater engagement and inclusion in the political system.

Age eligibility requirements in global perspective

To map out what age eligibility requirements look like worldwide, we constructed a dataset in partnership with the IPU, combining information from surveys completed by parliamentary information offices sent to the IPU in late 2017 with data that we coded from parliamentary websites in early 2018. Our dataset covers 192 single, lower, and upper houses of parliament in 144 countries (for the full list, see Inter-Parliamentary Union forthcoming). We have full data on voter and candidate eligibility ages for 169 chambers.

Figure 1 illustrates the share of parliamentary houses with candidate eligibility ages falling within four different age ranges. Approximately one-quarter of countries permit citizens to run for office at age 18 (or younger). More than half stipulate a minimum eligibility age of 20 to 25. Nearly 20% require citizens to be between 26 and 35 years old, and 4% establish a minimum age of 36 or older. Despite the recent reforms, Nigerian youth will still have to wait longer than many of their peers around the world before they will be eligible to run, between the ages of 25 and 35.

Table 1 compares the average and range of age requirements to vote and to run for office. Most countries establish a minimum voting age of 18. Countries that stipulate a voting age as low as 16 years old include Argentina, Austria, Brazil and Ecuador. In contrast, citizens in the United Arab Emirates must wait until they are 25. Requirements are far more varied in relation to candidate eligibility, ranging from 17 in Timor-Leste’s unicameral parliament to age 40 in the upper chambers of Algeria, Cambodia, the Czech Republic, Gabon and Paraguay. Juxtaposing these requirements, citizens must wait – on average – more than five years after becoming a voter before they can run for office themselves. The lack of overlap can be seen even more clearly in Figure 2, showing the number of chambers corresponding to voting and eligibility age requirements.

Table 1: Age requirements to vote and to run for office, compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age for voting</th>
<th>Average (mean)</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>Highest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age for holding office</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years waiting</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Minimum age eligibility requirements

Figure 2: Voter-eligibility age gaps in global perspective

In addition to these broad patterns, it is important to note differences between lower or single chambers versus upper houses of parliament. The average age required to run as a candidate for lower or unicameral chambers is 22 (ranging from 17 to 35), while for upper houses it is 29 (ranging from 18 to 45). On average, citizens must wait just under four years to become eligible to run for lower or unicameral chambers and nearly eleven years to run for election to upper houses.
Age eligibility debates

The contrasting age requirements for these two basic political rights are puzzling. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 1966 states that “Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity, without any of the restrictions mentioned in article 2 [distinctions based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status] and without unreasonable restrictions… [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage.”

In 1996, the UN Human Rights Committee made several clarifications regarding this Article via General Comment No. 25. Paragraph 4 reads: “Any conditions which apply to the exercise of the rights protected by Article 25 should be based on objective and reasonable criteria. For example, it may be reasonable to require a higher age for election or appointment to particular offices than for exercising the right to vote, which should be available to every adult citizen.”

The Human Rights Council does not specify in the document why it would be “objective and reasonable” to impose a higher age for candidacy versus voting. However, interviews and scholarly research provide some insights into the mentality behind this approach. Young people, for example, are often told by middle-aged politicians that their “turn in politics has yet to come” (Trantidis 2016: 154). During the debate in Nigeria, Ise Sagay, Chairman of the Presidential Advisory Committee against Corruption, said in an interview that a young person is not fit to be President of Nigeria, stressing the importance of climbing gradually up the ladder of success (Olaniyan 2018: 1). Along similar lines, political scientists most commonly use “political experience” as a measure for judging the “quality” of elected officials (Weeks and Baldez 2015: 122).

Yet, as many young politicians and activists are fond of saying, “youth are not the leaders of tomorrow…they are the leaders of today” (Inter-Parliamentary Union forthcoming). Moreover, as Samson Itodo, the YIAGA Executive Director, has argued, age does not determine competence. Indeed, qualities needed to succeed as a leader include having the opportunity to lead, opportunities to expand one’s skills, and a commitment to self-growth. Disqualifying youth on the grounds of being young, furthermore, begs the question of how exactly to gain the much needed “experience” to advance.

The global NotTooYoungToRun campaign thus seeks to flip the traditional script with the tagline: “We believe that if you’re old enough to vote, you’re old enough to run for office.” Partner organizations support the alignment of the voting and candidacy eligibility ages on the grounds that “young people deserve the same rights to run for office and age discrimination is a hindrance to full participation and democracy.” The campaign notes that people under the age of 30 form more than half of the world’s population, yet constitute less than 2% of all MPs. Indeed, approximately one-third of lower houses and more than 80% of upper houses have no young MPs under the age of 30.

In addition to Nigeria, a reduction in the age of candidate eligibility was undertaken in Algeria with the express purpose of stimulating youth representation (IPU 2016: 15). In early 2018, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan was reportedly considering reducing the eligibility age for all public offices to 20, following a 2015 reform lowering the voting age from 20 to 18. Supporters argue that lowering the candidacy eligibility age may earn the party greater support among younger voters, as well as spark greater interest in politics among youth. The proposal is endorsed by several opposition parties but also opposed by some more senior members of the LDP.

Despite their advocacy of the Age Reduction Bill in Nigeria, members of the NotTooYoungToRun coalition also recognize that simply signing the bill into law is not a guarantee that youth representation will increase. In their press release in early June 2018, therefore, they called for parliamentarians and political parties to take additional steps to stimulate youth participation. These include developing affirmative action measures to require a certain percentage of young candidates on party ballots, enacting electoral reform bills limiting campaign expenditures, introducing democratic primaries within political parties, and ensuring credible and peaceful elections (NotTooYoungToRun 2018a: 4). Young politicians in other countries similarly view these types of reforms as necessary for overcoming key barriers in access and resources faced by young candidates (Inter-Parliamentary Union forthcoming).

Youth representation in national parliaments

The dataset includes information on the age distribution of male and female MPs across nine age categories: 18-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70, 71-80, 81-90, and 91+. Figure 3 tabulates the global mean for six age groups, disaggregated by sex, and compares the share of MPs to the percentage of the global population within each age category. More than one-third of parliamentarians worldwide are in their fifties, and more than one-half are aged 51 and above. In contrast, MPs under the age of 40 constitute less than 15% of the total. Across all age groups, men outnumber women, often by significant proportions, although there is greater gender balance within the younger age cohorts. The figure shows in striking terms, finally, that parliamentarians under the age of 40 (particularly in the 21-30 age cohort) are under-represented in comparison to their share of the population, while MPs over the age of 40 (especially in the 51-60 age group) are massively over-represented.

Although the political representation of young people is understudied in comparison to the representation of women, ethnic minorities, and – to a lesser extent – the LGBT community and...
people with disabilities, the few surveys asking about the importance of representing different age groups in parliament find that "age" is identified as an important category of political representation. Lisi and Freire (2012: 373) find, for example, that parliamentarians in Belgium, France and Portugal identify "age" and "gender" to be the most legitimate targets of affirmative action in candidate selection processes. Along similar lines, data from the Political Participation and Representation (PARTIREP) project, which surveyed MPs across fourteen European countries, indicates that most consider it "fairly" or "very" important that a variety of ages be represented in parliament (see Figure 4).

![Figure 3: Global means by age and gender, upper and lower chamber, compared with population](image)

Figure 3: Global means by age and gender, upper and lower chamber, compared with population

Taken together, these various sources of data indicate that (1) young people are under-represented in parliaments around the world and that (2) political elites recognize a need to include younger cohorts to a greater extent. To bridge this gap, recent scholarly contributions explore the potential of youth quotas (Bidadanure 2014: 1; Tremmel et al. 2015: 1), as well as the role of party youth organizations (Bruter/Harrison 2009: 1; Hooghe et al. 2004: 193), to recruit and elect greater numbers of young people to political office. In comparison, age eligibility requirements largely remain under-theorized and under-studied in this literature.

Given varying definitions regarding the category of "youth", we explore the impact of eligibility requirements using three age thresholds: the share of parliamentarians under 30, under 40, and under 45. We find a strong correlation between lower candidate eligibility ages and higher proportions of young MPs at all three age thresholds. Figure 5 shows the relationship for MPs under the age of 45, which is the definition of "young" adopted by the IPU Forum of Young Parliamentarians. The correlation is -0.414 and is highly statistically significant: as the eligibility age increases, the share of young MPs decreases. This pattern remains true and significant for the other two definitions of "young", as well as when comparing age requirements and median MP age. It holds true too for both lower and upper chambers.

![Figure 5: Share of MPs by age eligibility requirements](image)

Figure 5: Share of MPs by age eligibility requirements

There are, of course, a number of factors, outside of age requirements, that might also be significant in predicting the percentage of young MPs. The electoral system is one such factor. We find that MPs under 45 constitute an average of 30.9% of MPs in legislative bodies elected via proportional representation (PR), but only 25.7% of those elected using majoritarian electoral systems (a difference that is statistically significant at p≤0.05). Similarly, we find that there is a small but statistically significant difference in the age of the median MP in PR versus majoritarian systems; the average MP elected via majoritarian system is aged 52.7, whereas the average MP elected via PR is 51.2 years (p≤0.05). Other possible factors include the age of the country’s population, which shapes the pool from which potential candidates are drawn; the level of democracy, which affects how “open” the political system may be; and level of development, which we measure using the Commonwealth Youth Development Index, measuring how active young people (defined as 15-29) are in civic and political life. To test the independent impact of age requirements, we rerun our statistical analyses while controlling for these other factors. The resulting regression coefficients, and their confidence intervals, are plotted in Figure 6. The age of eligibility is statistically significant (p≤0.01), and the coefficient is -.73. In substantive terms, the average impact of reducing the minimum age to stand for office from 25 to 18 would be to increase the proportion of MPs under 45 by over 5 percentage points (see Appendix 1 for full output). These findings indicate an immediate effect: lower age requirements positively affect the representation of the youngest cohort in parliament.

In one final test, we explore the longer-term effects of minimum age requirements, by looking at whether age requirements have
an impact on the presence of young MPs outside those targeted specifically by the minimum age requirement. To do this, we look at the impact that age requirements on the presence of 31-40 year olds in legislative chambers where the eligibility age is 30 or below. This is testing for an indirect effect, as 31-40 year olds are free to stand for office. Technically, therefore, the minimum age requirements should not impact the presence of this “young group” per the intentions of the policy. Using the same set of variables, we find that minimum age requirements have a statistically significant effect on the presence of younger MPs, even outside of those ages specifically and directly barred from office by the age restriction (see Appendix 2 for full output). This provides evidence for a downstream effect: lower eligibility positively influences the share of MPs in the next youngest cohort.

Figure 6: Regression coefficients and confidence intervals

A theory of mobilizing effects
The statistical analysis indicates that candidate age eligibility requirements have both a short- and long-term impact on the representation of young people in parliament. We theorize that lower age limits have “mobilizing effects”, shifting the calculations of potential candidates in terms of the age at which they first decide to run for office. We draw inspiration from the work of Geissel and Hust (2005: 222), who explore how introducing gender quotas affects political interest and political ambition among women. Examining women in local politics in Germany and India, they find that many women elected via quotas did not have earlier plans to run for public office. Quota adoption changed these calculations, creating opportunities for women to enter the political sphere – both of their own accord and due to increased recruitment efforts by political parties. Once in office, these female politicians gained a greater sense of political competence – as well as developed aspirations to contest other, higher political offices. The authors describe this as the “mobilizing capacity” of gender quotas.

We argue that lower age limits may operate in an analogous fashion, perhaps even more so in countries adopting reforms that reduce the eligibility age. Like women, youth are under-represented in electoral politics, albeit to varying degrees across countries. One barrier to youth participation relates to perceived inexperience, with older politicians in their own parties suggesting that they “wait their turn” to run for political office.11 Their opponents may also seek to gain electoral advantage, “attempting to equate youth with ignorance and inexperience” (Mandel/Kleeman 2004: 18), according to a 2002 survey in the United States.

Due to their age, young people also often lack name recognition to stand as viable candidates. Further, they tend to be located outside the networks of more senior politicians needed to come to the attention of and be nominated by political parties. Bjarnegård (2013: 3) makes a similar observation with regard to women, arguing that male-dominated political networks are a key – if not the key – reason women tend to be excluded as candidates in Thailand. Finally, like women, many young people simply do not have the financial resources required to run a traditional political campaign.12 In the case of young people, this is because they often tend to be at the start of their professional careers – or, more broadly, due to high unemployment rates among youth.13

One barrier to youth participation relates to perceived inexperience, with older politicians in their own parties suggesting that they “wait their turn” to run for political office.

The decision to run for office involves considering the relative costs and benefits of launching a political campaign. In a study of postgraduate students in law and public policy at two major universities in the United States, Shames (2017: 88) finds that the vast majority of these students – who are otherwise committed to a life in public service, given their choice of field of study – perceived that the costs of running far outweighed the benefits. Those who tended to see more benefits over costs – and thus were least likely to be deterred from running – were those who largely resemble representatives currently in office: white, male, with higher incomes, and very politically engaged.

In Shames’s (2017: 5, 15) sample, about 15% of the respondents had considered running for office. A far greater proportion (69%), however, appeared “moveable” towards greater consideration of running if the conditions were right. Young people thus not only harbour political ambitions, but these aspirations are malleable over time. The first point is supported by data from a survey of young party members across six European countries, which similarly finds that a sizeable minority have long desired to become politicians (Bruter/Harrison 2009: 38f.). The second point is corroborated by research on young elected officials in Norway, who report that the opportunity to hold office had given them a taste for political work, such that many planned to run again in the future (Winsvold et al. 2017: 307).

Young people thus not only harbour political ambitions, but these aspirations are malleable over time.

Based on these insights, we theorize that lower age limits can have an immediate effect in permitting – if not encouraging – younger people to contest political office. One month after achieving presidential assent, the NotTooYoungToRun campaign celebrated by officially launching its ReadyToRun programme in preparation for the 2019 elections in Nigeria. The programme was conceived in December 2017, in anticipation of the reform, with the aim of preparing young people to begin working on their political campaigns – despite, at that time, being too young to stand as candidates. A number of young people inspired to come forward as candidates, moreover, placed the hashtag #NotTooYoungToRun on their campaign posters.14 These patterns suggest that re-
Recognizing that political careers do not necessarily start at the top, we also theorize longer-term, or downstream, effects. Local politics provides a useful starting point for a political career, with lower barriers to entry. It also affords opportunities to gain political experience and make connections necessary for advancing to higher levels of office, including parliament. In some countries, young volunteers themselves can open the way: in the 2011 local elections in Norway, the proportion of local councillors aged 18 to 25 doubled, largely due to preference votes cast by younger voters (Saglie et al. 2015: 268). An early start in politics is often crucial for later political success: in the United States, more than half of the top political leaders – presidents, representatives, senators, and governors – won their first elected office before the age of 35 (Mandel/Kleeman 2004: 7).

A study of party youth wings in Belgium provides insight into the mechanisms producing these downstream effects. The authors find that 41% of city councillors had started their political careers as young party activists. Due to the networks they developed at this early stage, they gained a “head start in politics”. Former youth members were first nominated as local candidates at 31 and won their first mandate at 34. In comparison, those who had not been engaged in their party’s youth organization first became candidates at 39 and office holders at 42. This eight-year difference in the first time being elected, the authors point out, can make a significant difference in the ability to be elected eventually to parliament or other higher office at a later date, given that opportunities to advance in politics are limited by electoral cycles (Hooghe et al. 2004: 202).

Low eligibility ages, [...] unlike electoral quotas, do not necessarily affect the demand for these candidates by actually requiring parties to nominate a greater share of youth.

These immediate and downstream effects, however, are not guaranteed. Low eligibility ages for candidacy remove legal barriers standing in the way of young people coming forward, thus enhancing the potential supply of younger candidates. Yet, unlike electoral quotas, they do not necessarily affect the demand for these candidates by actually requiring parties to nominate a greater share of youth. As a result, the percentage of young MPs in Nigeria – which is consistently below the global average for every age threshold in both houses of parliament¹⁰ – is not likely to translate into greater youth representation without supporting measures on both the supply and demand sides. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that this aspect of the reform is possibly what enabled the Age Reduction Bill to pass in the first place. The NotTooYoungToRun campaign was keenly aware of the need not to frame the reform in terms of “kicking out” or “taking the positions” of older MPs, on whose support they relied to pass the constitutional amendment. They opted instead to argue that the reform would contribute to a spir-
indicates that campaigns to this end can additionally serve an important awareness-raising role on the broader importance of youth leadership. At the celebratory conference one month after the passage of the bill, Senate President Bukola Saraki observed: “The Not Too Young To Run Law reflects the energy possessed by our youth, which shows that today not tomorrow belongs to the youth” (NotTooYoungToRun 2018b: 2).

Notes
1 See http://www.nottoooyoungtorun.org/about.
2 http://yiaga.org/nottoooyoungtorun/about-us.
3 Most of these interviews were conducted as part of a consulting assignment for the IPU’s 2019 youth representation report, identifying and exploring barriers to – and strategies for promoting – the participation of young people in parliament.
4 See http://www.nottoooyoungtorun.org/about.
7 See http://www.partirep.eu.
9 We are not, unfortunately, able to include a measure for incumbency rates, which may also affect levels of youth representation, due to lack of data availability.
10 A number of variables from the regression model were excluded from the coefficient plot for purposes of visualization. Full regression output can be found in Appendix 1.
11 Conversations with Kacie Starr Tripplet (St. Louis, MO, city councilor), 2009-2012.
12 This lack of resources can be exacerbated by childcare costs incurred in pursuing a political career.
13 Interviews with Malik Alkassoum (MP, Niger), 8 June 2018; Nate Erskine-Smith (MP, Canada), 5 June 2018; Yaumi Mpaweni (MP, Malawi), 30 May 2018.
14 Interview with Ibrahim Faruk (YIAGA), 22 June 2018.
15 The global average is 2.1% MPs under 30, 15.2% MPs under 40, and 27.1% MPs under 45. The corresponding figures for Nigeria are 0%, 11.1%, and 25.8% in the lower house and 0%, 0%, and 7.3% in the upper house (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018).
16 Interview with Ibrahim Faruk (YIAGA), 22 June 2018.
17 Conversation with Rafael Igbakwe (MP, Nigeria), 22 June 2018.

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Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum age requirement</th>
<th>Coefficient (S.E.)</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system (PR)</td>
<td>1.70 (2.14)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>% population under 30</td>
<td>0.21 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth development index</td>
<td>0.49** (0.16)</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy score</td>
<td>-0.73 (0.70)</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower chamber</td>
<td>5.31 (3.12)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>19.64 (23.1)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

$F$ score 6.82***  
$R^2$ 0.239

$Adj R^2$ 0.204

DV: % MPs aged 45 and under.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix 1: Full regression output MPs aged 45 and under

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum age requirement</th>
<th>Coefficient (S.E.)</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral system (PR)</td>
<td>0.94 (2.09)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>% population under 30</td>
<td>0.20 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.28)</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth development index</td>
<td>0.42** (0.16)</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy score</td>
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<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower chamber</td>
<td>4.98 (2.99)</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>24.04 (23.30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$F$ score 3.71**  
$R^2$ 0.159

$Adj R^2$ 0.116

DV: % MPs aged 31-45.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix 2: Full regression output MPs aged 31-45
Youth representation in the European Parliament: The limited effect of political party characteristics

by Aksel Sundström and Daniel Stockemer

Abstract: Which party characteristics contribute to the representation of young legislators? We examine this question quantitatively, focusing on the European Parliament (EP), and gauge the influence of the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of its support, party ideology and party nomination procedures on the age of politicians, based on data of all members who have served in the EP. We find that none of these characteristics matter substantively in explaining young representatives' presence and discuss ways to further the field of research on youth representation.

Keywords: Young people, Parliamentary representation, Parties

Introduction

Parties are central for candidate selection to political office: They nominate contenders on lists as well as for direct seats and determine the candidate pool that voters can choose from (Meserve et al. 2009; Scarrow 2015; Webb 2010). As such, parties should have a tremendous influence on the demographic composition not only of the candidate pool, but also on the politicians who gain election. For example, research shows that recruitment structures in parties have an influence on the gendered composition of legislatures (Caul 1999), on the regional representation of politicians in their parliamentary caucus (Deschouwer/Depauw 2014), and on the proportion of politicians from the ethnic minority group within their party caucuses as well as the whole legislature (Schönwälder 2013). In this study, we broaden the scope of previous studies by focusing on a so far under-researched group, namely young people. While young adults may have normative claims to be represented in parliaments, they are generally marginalised in terms of legislative presence across the globe (Stockemer/Sundström 2018).

We pose the following question for research: Which party characteristics contribute to the representation of young legislators? We examine this research question in a quantitative research design taking advantage of the institutional structure of the European Parliament (EP). We use data on the age of the over 6,000 Members of the EP (MEPs) ever elected, matched with information on five party characteristics that may explain variation in the presence of young parliamentarians; the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of party support, the ideology of the party, and the party’s nomination procedures. We regress a parliamentarian’s age on these party characteristics and find that none of these characteristics matters.

Which party characteristics contribute to the representation of young legislators?

We adopt the following structure: First, we situate this study with the literature on political representation. Next, we explain the case, research design and methods. We then present our results. Finally, we summarise the main findings and discuss how these insights can inform future research on youth representation.

Young people, political engagement and political representation

A characteristic of young people today is their political disengagement. This disengagement with formal politics manifests itself on two levels. First, the young generation today is the one that participates the least of all generations in elections, is the least politically interested, and the least politically represented in political offices (O’Neill 2007; Bhatti et al. 2012). To highlight this point: research focusing on Western countries (Wattenberg 2015) has found that young people lack basic knowledge about their political system, show little interest in political matters and display turnout numbers that are sometimes 30 or 40% lower than those of older generations. As an example of this increased disengagement, Blais and Loewen (2011) find that from the 1960s to the 2000s, turnout rates of newly eligible voters in Canada dropped from 70 to 40%.

In tandem with the crisis of political interest and participation, we are also experiencing a crisis of political representation of young adults. In modern societies, young people – defined largely as individuals in between 18 and 35 years, or 18 and 40 – are generally underrepresented, making up less than 10% of the national legislators despite the fact that they constitute 20 to 30% (and sometimes even more) of the voting age population (Stockemer/Sundström 2018). For example, several countries – such as the United States and India – could possibly be characterised as gerontocracies, where rulers are significantly older than the population. Other countries, such as Japan, has been labelled a “silver democracy”, because young people are literally absent in elected assemblies system and decisions tend to favour the opinions of citizens above 65 years (Sota 2018). Existing comparative studies on young people’s representation concur that the legislative presence of young is low and that this underrepresentation negatively influences the democratic attitudes and the political engagement of young cohorts of the population (Joshi 2013; IPU 2014). Taken together, the crises of participation and representation constitute a vicious cycle of political disenagement among young adults (Prainsack/Vodanovic 2013). On the one hand, young people, because they do not see themselves and their concerns represented, become more and more politically disenfranchised. On the other, there is a risk that parties cater less and less to the demands of the young generation, both substantively and representationally, because the group of young voters becomes increasingly small (Van Parijs 1998).
Belonging to the group of young is different than belonging to other politically marginalised groups, such as women or ethnic minorities, because being young is only a temporary stage in life. Yet, this does not make the topic of youth representation less relevant. Rather contrary, the continuing representation of young people in legislatures is crucial both from a normative and a policy perspective (Henn/Foard 2012). Normatively, a democracy should provide opportunities for political participation for all citizens regardless of one's ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender or age (Phillips 1998). From a policy perspective, young people may have interests and hold views that are likely to differ significantly from that of older individuals. To illustrate, some policy areas – e.g., rules of military conscription (such as the draft in the United States) and age limits on the rights of drinking, driving, voting as well as standing for elections – affect citizens differently based on their age. This may especially be true for spending priorities of public funds. Empirical findings suggest that young adults tend to favour free secondary and tertiary education, while the middle-aged may be more averse to increased taxation (Jennings/Niemi 2014). Another aspect is differences in values. Young individuals tend to have more pluralistic and egalitarian beliefs, whereas older individuals have a tendency to hold more traditional attitudes (Abramson/Inglehart 2009). For example, McEvoy (2016) notes that young Europeans are more supportive of same-sex marriage than older ones.

If nobody represents young adults, it is unlikely that their specific priorities are taken into consideration.

These differences in priorities might directly translate into policy. If nobody represents young adults, it is unlikely that their specific priorities will be taken into consideration. For instance, our own work suggests that, as in the population, young members in the US House of Representatives tend to vote for stricter environmental legislation compared to older ones. In general terms, the literature supports the assumption that higher descriptive representation of an outgroup leads to higher substantive representation. For example, in an experimental study, Mendelberg et al. (2014) find that a critical mass of women in decision-making bodies is needed so that women can voice and push through distinctive female concerns pertaining to the family, children, and redistribution politics. Focusing on another “outgroup” in politics – lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people – Hansen and colleagues (2015) show that LGBT legislators can positively influence symbolic (low-cost gestures and actions) and substantive representation (laws regulating the rights of the LGBT community). We believe that the same will be true for young adults.

Hence, encouraging young people to participate in politics, and to give them the chances to do so, might not only positively influence their democratic credentials by telling them that their views are taken seriously and respected in the political arena (Giroux 2003), but may break the vicious cycle of disengagement as well. The academic literature could also do its part by raising more awareness of the underrepresentation of young adults in the political process and by elucidating the factors that contribute to young people's underrepresentation.

In fact, the existing studies – fewer than a dozen in number – illustrate that for various Western countries the age group between 50 and 65 is the most overrepresented in parliaments (see Narud/Valen 2000; Murray 2008; Kissau et al. 2012). When it comes to explanatory factors, the literature is even scarcer and mainly focuses on the role of electoral systems to explain variation in young people's representation. For instance, Reynolds (2011) finds that plurality rule fosters the election of young adults. In contrast, Joshi's (2013) study of a handful of Southeast Asian countries reports the contrary; that is, proportional representation fosters the election of young legislators (see also Joshi 2015). Stockemer and Sundström's (2018) comparative study confirms this latter finding using a global sample of more than 100 countries.

Yet, what is missing from existing studies is a comprehensive analysis of political parties. This is surprising given that parties are at the centre of the recruitment process; they fill the representative space and aggregate interests (Gauja 2016). Even more importantly, it is mainly party elites who decide who gets nominated, for what constituency or on which list position (Hassell 2016). Given the empirical record of a stark underrepresentation of young politicians, it is safe to conclude that political parties are reluctant to nominate young members to their parliamentary delegations. Nevertheless, there is variation between parties. For example, in the European Parliament – the empirical referent of our study – there are some party delegations, such as the one of the Spanish Podemos Party in the most recent parliament, in which the average age was less than 40 at the time of election. Other delegations, such as the ones from parties in Estonia or Poland, do not have a single parliamentarian aged 40 or below in the current 2014–2019 Parliament.

Which party characteristics contribute to the representation of young legislators? We test this question based on a comprehensive analysis of five party features. While the empirical record indicates that parties are reluctant (to say the least) to nominate young candidates, there should still be variation in the types of political parties in promoting or hindering young politicians to gain representation. Therefore, party features should matter in influencing the representation of young adults in parliaments including the EP. In this article, we evaluate the extent to which the five party features – the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of party support, party ideology, and formal recruitment procedures – explain variation in parties’ propensity to have young politicians elected for a seat in Strasbourg and Brussels.

We evaluate the extent to which the five party features – the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of party support, party ideology, and formal recruitment procedures – explain variation in parties’ propensity to have young politicians elected for a seat in Strasbourg and Brussels.

Party characteristics and youth representation: hypotheses

Age of the party leader
Party elites are important in the candidate nomination process and the most important elite person is the party leader. In particular, the leader can propel individuals upwards within the party hierarchy and on electoral lists. We see several reasons why young party leaders should promote other young candidates. First, the
psychological literature highlights that individuals tend to prefer other individuals that resemble themselves (Hamlin et al. 2013). According to Crowder-Meyer (2013), this should be especially true for outgroup leaders, who might be particularly willing to support members of their own group to control imbalances in representation. As such, young leaders representing one outgroup might be especially willing to nominate other young adults. Second, the professional and private networks of young leaders should naturally consist of other young individuals, which, in turn, should further foster their likelihood to nominate other young individuals. Third, young leaders might feel more of a normative need to balance the inequalities in age representation than older leaders.

Hypothesis 1: Parties with a younger party leader are likely to have younger MEPs.

The age of the party
The age of the party organisation is a second party-level factor that might influence the representation of young legislators. Most importantly, we expect that old organisations have long-established networks of command consisting mainly of middle-aged and senior men, so-called “old boys networks” (Dahlerup/Leyenaar 2013). Outgroups, including female and young party members, might have problems in penetrating these networks, which have formed over decades and which are crucial for the advancement of a political career (e.g. Bjarnegård/Kenny 2015). In contrast, younger parties do not usually have the same established and close-knit networks, which tend to benefit middle-aged and old men. In these parties, politicians of different ages, including the young, should find a more level playing field because closed-off networks are likely to be rarer.

Hypothesis 2: Parties that are younger are likely to have younger MEPs.

The size of party support
The third characteristic is the size of the party’s support base, which directly influences the party’s magnitude. Parties with a small legislative presence that can count on nominating only one or two members to the parliament are likely to nominate the type of individual which has the largest appeal to voters. In most cases, actors in gate-keeping positions of parties still think that this “winning candidate” is a middle-aged to senior man (Henig/Henig 2001; Beauregard 2014). Young individuals might therefore not gain much traction if the party magnitude is small. In contrast, parties with larger support might have an incentive to diversify their slates to appeal to as many constituents as possible (in particular in the larger EU countries a large support base triggers a high party magnitude in EP elections). This diversification might include the nomination of young individuals on eligible lists to portray the party as inclusive as possible.

Hypothesis 3: Parties with larger vote shares are likely to have younger MEPs.

Party ideology
We believe that the ideology of parties should not only matter in determining the voters they attract, the policy programmes they adopt and the legislation they pass if they are in power, but also the type of representatives they send to parliament (Paxton/Kunovich 2003). Generally, left-leaning parties with a pluralistic and egalitarian culture should send more young individuals to parliament than traditional parties with a rather more regressive agenda. Nevertheless, a simple dichotomy between left and right might be too simplistic to capture the multidimensionality of the ideological space in Western societies in the 21st century (Caul 1999). To highlight this point: a party such as the Front National can be economically left-leaning but highly conservative in social values. Other parties, such as some green or former communist parties, tend to be state-centred economically but very post-modern when it comes to their social values (Burchell 2014). With regard to the ideological party space in Europe, there is also a third important value dimension, the pro-/anti-European integration dimension (see Bakker et al. 2012). Since the three dimensions do not necessarily overlap, we formulate hypotheses for each of them in the following sections.

With regard to the economic dimension, we expect state-centred (i.e. left-leaning) parties to nominate, on average, younger individuals for electoral positions than centre or right-wing parties.

Hypothesis 4a: Parties with a left-leaning position on economic issues are more likely than economically right-leaning parties to have young MEPs.

Even more so than the economic dimension, we expect the libertarian/authoritarian cleavage to affect the representation of the young. Compared to their parents and grandparents, younger generations are more pluralistic and open to new ways of living and cultures. Parties with a post-materialist/libertarian position carry the values of the majority of young adults (see Sloam 2014). For example, some green parties such as the German Green Party promote very progressive values and are disproportionally popular among the young on Election Day (Dolezal 2010). It is thus likely that the parliamentary delegation of these parties is also comparatively young. In contrast, parties with an authoritarian platform tend to be traditional, protectionist and masculine, values that might not appeal to the majority of the young (Givens 2005). Having a rather old support base, these parties also tend to have an older parliamentary delegation.

Hypothesis 4b: Parties leaning towards a libertarian position are more likely to have young MEPs than those with an authoritarian position.
In Europe, the pro-/anti-European cleavage is another important policy dimension, in particular for the young. Young individuals tend to support Europe and the European ideals; Europe provides them with opportunities to travel, study and work. Since young people tend to be strong advocates for European integration, and it is they who carry forward the European idea most convincingly, it is likely that pro-European parties will also nominate more young politicians (Keating 2014). More indirectly, pro-European parties also frequently fare best in cosmopolitan cities, which also have a higher share of younger-generation inhabitants than rural areas. In contrast, older individuals tend to be more sceptical about the European idea (Gorodzisky/Semyonov 2015). They might fear for their traditions, values and their nation state and might be drawn to more Eurosceptic parties, which, in turn, can be expected to nominate more of the elderly.

**Hypothesis 4c:** Pro-EU parties are more likely than anti-EU parties to have young MEPs.

**Since young people tend to be strong advocates for European integration, and it is they who carry forward the European idea most convincingly, it is likely that pro-European parties will also nominate more young politicians.**

A similar argument could be made for young candidates. In the 21st century, there should be numerous young candidates who have the ability, background and capability to put their name down for a nomination. As such, personal nominations or applications could benefit young individuals. In contrast, in party nominations young candidates might not even be part of the pool of candidates to be considered, because they do not have the network connection and experience, yet. A similar argument can be made about the selectorate: a very small selectorate of a small party elite mainly consisting of middle-aged to senior men may be less prone to present diverse lists that reflect the heterogeneity of the social groups in the party. In contrast, a large selectorate — consisting of a broader composition of actors — might benefit outgroups including women and the young.

**Hypothesis 5a:** Parties promoting self-nominations/applications rather than party nominations are likely to have younger MEPs.

**Formal recruitment procedures**

Finally — and using a subsample of our data, because information on this feature is only available for certain years — we look at the influence of formal recruitment procedures on youth representation. An article by Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2015) suggests that different nomination procedures (i.e. self-nominations/applications versus party-nominations) as well as the inclusiveness of the selectorate matters for the nomination and election of female MEPs. We define the selectorate in legislative recruitment as “the group selecting the candidates” (2015: 770). They argue that self-nominations/applications could benefit the nomination/representation of women; it allows those who have the ability and confidence to step forward. In contrast, party nominations are dependent on the decision by party-elites, which tend to consist of middle-aged men who often exclude outsiders such as women. Hence, they might be less likely to nominate women.

**Data and methods**

Our case to study the influence of party characteristics on youth representation is the European Parliament (EP). The EP gathers together parties from all member states of the European Union. While nationally all of these parties operate within a different institutional context, they all run in the EP election within the same three to four days’ election timeframe under a similar institutional context (i.e. after 1999 all parties get elected in multi-member districts) (Meserve et al. 2009). The fact that they are running for the same parliament, within the same time window and in a similar institutional context, increases the comparability of parties across countries (Raunio 2014).

In theory, the EP should be an institutional setting where young candidates could perform comparatively well. Generally labelled “second-order elections”, the EP elections are considered less important than the first-order national parliamentary or presidential elections in the eyes of the media, politicians and voters (Schmitt 2005). As a result, a seat in Brussels and Strasbourg might not be as prestigious as a seat in the national legislature. This, in turn, could increase the chances of young individuals to gain a seat for two reasons. First, party elites might prefer a seat in the national legislature or executive. Second, a run for the EP might be a first stepping-stone for young individuals to gain their first parliamentary experience.

We test the influence of our different party characteristics on the age of MEPs based on the full population of legislators who have ever served in the eight European Parliaments that have existed so far (1979-1984 to 2014-2019). In the statistical analysis that follows, the bivariate graphs and the multivariate models measure the effect of the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of party support, and the ideology of the party on youth representation between 6069 and 5616 observations. Because of data unavailability for the other years, the models measuring the effect of territorial nominations and the selectorate on youth representation use a subsample of approximately 700 MEPs for the session 2009-2014.

The dependent variable is the age of each parliamentarian at the time of election. We opt against an aggregation of the age of individual MEPs to the party level for several reasons: first, such a structure would treat small parties with one or two MEPs similarly to large parties with 20 or 30 seats, despite the fact that the former only add a much smaller number of MEPs than the latter. Second, aggregating the data would also lead to more variation in the average or median age among smaller parties as compared to larger parties. To highlight this point: a party might send one member to Brussels and Strasbourg aged 70 years at time t. At the next election (t +1) the MEP might retire and be “replaced” by a young candidate aged 35. Hence, the aggregate age difference between the two elections would be 35 years. For larger parties, these considerable differences in the average or median age will...
not happen. For these reasons, having individual MEPs as unit of analysis seems to be the most clear-cut analytical choice.

In theory, the EP should be an institutional setting where young candidates could perform comparatively well.

Our party variables are operationalised as follows. The first variable, the age of the party leader, is the age (in years) of the party leader at the time of the election. Information on party leadership is primarily built from Zárate’s Political Collections (2016). We complemented this information by various sources on leaders’ date of birth, such as their personal webpages and publications such as the Political Handbook of the World (Lansford 2015). In the few cases where a party had several leaders or spokespersons (i.e. some green parties), we computed an average figure of their age. When a leadership change took place in the same year as an EP election, we chose the leader prior to the election. The second variable, party age, gauges the age (in years) of the respective party at the time of election. We mainly collected this information from the respective parties’ websites as well as from Zárate’s Political Collections (2016). The third variable, size of the party support, is the vote share that the respective party gained in the preceding national election. While we acknowledge that there are some fluctuations in parties’ vote share between the national and the European Elections (e.g. non-government parties tend to gain support in the second-order context), we nevertheless believe that the national vote share provides a good estimate for parties to calculate their expected vote share in the EP elections. The data on a party’s national level vote share for the election preceding the European context come from the European Election Database (2016).

We used data from the ParlGov project to code the three dimensions of parties’ ideology (Döring/Manow 2016). The ParlGov data has information on party positions that are time-invariant unweighted mean values of established party expert surveys on a 0 to 10 scale. The economic scale aggregates the taxes versus spending dimension by Benoit and Laver (2006) with the dimension on state intervention in the economy by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015). The libertarian versus authoritarian dimension uses the same sources and aggregates positions related to personal freedoms as well as the environment and lifestyles. The EU dimension gauges established measures (Ray 1999; Benoit/Laver 2006) on parties’ stance toward the EU based on their general orientations toward the EU, as well as their views on EU expansion.8

The third variable, size of the party support, is the vote share that the respective party gained in the preceding national election.

For the dimensions of formal recruitment procedures, we used two variables compiled by Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2015). *Nominations* is a variable with four categories, gauging whether (a) candidates can formally nominate themselves, (b) if they have to be nominated, (c) whether parties allow for both types, or (d) if this information is unknown. To capture these four categories, we created three dummy variables, with the category “candidates can formally nominate themselves” serving as the reference category. The second dimension, the *inclusiveness of the selectorate* measures the size of the selectorate. It has six categories: (1) all party members, (2) a subset of all party members, (3) committees, (4) party executives, (5) not specified and (6) mixed actors.9 The first category again serves as the reference category, the other five categories are captured by dummy variables.

To analyse the influence of party characteristics on the age of elected officials, we engage in six types of analyses. First, we display some univariate tables confirming the notion that the representation of young individuals at the European Parliament is low. Second, we present a number of scatterplots displaying the bivariate relationship between each of the four independent variables – the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of the party support, and the party ideology – and the dependent variable, the age of MEPs. To measure the influence of the nomination and selectorate dummy variables, we also display some descriptive statistics. Third, we present a multiple regression model (i.e. OLS regression), where we regress the age of the politician at the time of election on the four party level characteristics for which we have complete data.10 There is also a very high turnover rate. In fact, we find that of the total of 6069 observations, only 2423 were filled by incumbents. Substantively, this high turnover rate should give young candidates ample chances to get elected. More methodologically, this significant turnover rate makes a clustered approach or a pooled time series framework less suitable for the study at hand.

To analyse the influence of party characteristics on the age of elected officials, we engage in six types of analyses.

Fourth, we run separate OLS models for each of the eight parliamentary sessions (1979-1984 to 2014-2019), to disentangle possible trends over time. We deem OLS regressions an adequate modelling strategy. First, the dependent variable, the age of each parliamentarian at the time of the election, is normally distributed. Second, the high turnover rate renders a pooled approach impossible to perform. In the fifth step of the analysis, we perform two additional analyses as robustness checks. We create a dummy variable for young MEPs aged 40 and under at the time of election and run a binary logistic regression with this additional dependent variable. Moreover, we create an ordinal variable distinguishing young parliamentarians (aged 40 and under), middle-aged parliamentarians (aged 41 to 60) and elderly parliamentarians (aged 61 and above) and measure the influence of our party-level characteristics on this categorical variable in an ordinal regression framework. Finally, as a sixth step, we run an OLS model with our 2009-2014 data featuring nomination procedures and different types of selectorates on the right-hand side and the age of the MEP on the left hand side of the equation.

**Results from the quantitative investigation**

First, the univariate statistics confirm that there is indeed an underrepresentation of young legislators over time. Throughout the history of the EP, the presence of young MEPs of 40 years and below at the time of election has constantly loitered between 16 and 20%. This figure has remained constant throughout the EP’s history (see Tables 1 and 2). If we look at the percentages of individuals of 35 years and below at the time of election they
are generally under 10% in the nearly four-decade history of the EP. Even more telling, the mean and median age of incoming MEPs is approximately 50 years (see Table 3). In more detail, the average MEP is elected at the age of 50.2. There is some slight variation between Western and Eastern Europe. Throughout the parliament’s history, MEPs from the West are 50.6 years old at the time of elections and MEPs from the East “only” 48.2 years old. This implies that at the end of each parliamentary term, the outgoing parliament has a median age of about 55 years, which is substantially older than the constituents in the EU, with a median age of 42.6 years in 2016 (Eurostat 2017).

### Table 1: Age distribution of MEPs since 1979, at the start of a term (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency (n)</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>1058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 60</td>
<td>3950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 60</td>
<td>1060</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Age distribution through the eight parliamentary terms, at the start of a term (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50.35</td>
<td>50.95</td>
<td>50.08</td>
<td>49.12</td>
<td>49.56</td>
<td>49.59</td>
<td>50.05</td>
<td>50.38</td>
<td>51.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Median age throughout the eight parliaments, at the start of a term (years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Median Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979-1984</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1989</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-1994</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1999</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2004</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2014</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-2019</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we look at individual parties, we find that the youngest party delegation was, on average, 21 years old and the oldest 78 years. However, parties with a median and average age below 30 or above 70 are generally single-person delegations. In the category of very young delegations (i.e. those aged under 30, on average), we find, for example, the German Pirate Party in 2014, the Portuguese Communist Party in 2009, or the Danish Peoples’ Movement Against the EU in 2014. In the category very old (i.e. delegations with an average age over 70 years), we find the Polish Labour Union (2014), the Communist Party of Greece (1989), and the Christian Social Peoples’ Party of Luxembourg in 2004. In general, another trend we note is that the larger party delegations tend to be aged 50 to 60 years, on average, over the span of our study. This includes the Christian Democratic Party of Germany, the Socialist Party in France or Labour in Great Britain.

How much influence do party characteristics have on the age of incoming parliamentarians? Figures 1 to 6 disconfirm all of our initial hypotheses. Even in the bivariate realm the predicted line between any of the measures of party characteristics and the age of parliamentarians is rather flat in all graphs, indicating little to no impact. Neither the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of the party support, nor the ideology of the party influence whether parties send older or younger MEPs to Brussels and Strasbourg. Even more disappointing, the multivariate regression model indicates that all of the party characteristics together explain only about 1% in the variance in the age variation in the European parliament (see Table 5). The libertarian/authoritarian ideology dimension is the only variable where we find some very small substantive influence. As such, the regression model predicts that a rather libertarian party with a ranking of two is expected to have MEPs two years younger, on average, than a rather authoritarian party with a ranking of seven. For the other variables the influence is non-perceptible.

Neither the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size of the party support, nor the ideology of the party influence whether parties send older or younger MEPs to Brussels and Strasbourg.

If we look at the eight regression analyses for the parliamentary sessions 1979-1984 to 2014-2019, there are also no consistent findings and the models have little to no explanatory power, explaining between 1 and 8% of the variance in a parliamentarian’s age (see Table 6). If we look at individual predictors, we see no consistent results. The only variable that has a significant influence in most models is the age of the party leader; yet substantively this influence is, again, tiny. The lack of influence of the party characteristics is further confirmed in the binary and ordinary logistic regressions (Table 7). Not only have both models a miniscule pseudo R squared, even more importantly, the proportional reduction in error is 0% for both models, further illustrating that the models do not add anything in comparison to random selection.

When we look at nomination procedures, the picture is similar (Table 8). With the exception that local nominations seem to slightly benefit the presence of young MEPs (i.e. local nominations trigger parliamentary party delegations that are two to three years younger than nominations at another territorial level), neither the other levels of nomination nor the type of selectorate matters. This applies even more so considering that in our regression framework, the three dummy variables for levels of nominations and the five dummies for type of selectorate explain about 1% of the variance in parliamentarians’ age variation.

### Conclusion

This study allows for rather sober conclusions. Even in a second-order setting, like the European Parliament, young people’s representation has been consistently low. Throughout the parliament’s history about 10% of the members have been aged 35 years below and the median parliamentarian at the time of her election has been aged over 50 years. We also find that parties of all types seem to do little to actively promote the presence of young adults and break the vicious cycle of young people’s political disengagement. Whether these political parties are old or young, have a larger or smaller support base, are right or left-leaning, or whether they have a younger or older leader, they all appear reluctant to see young MEPs elected.
What might increase young people’s representation could be the adoption of quotas (see Remmel et al. 2015). As the literature on women’s representation shows, quotas can provide a relatively quick boost in the representation of a so-far underrepresented group (Paxton/Hughes 2016). With a quota of 10 or 20%, parties would actually be obliged to replace some of their available seats with young candidates. This would give a direct boost to youth representation. Quotas could also have an indirect and psycholog-

effect; they would show to young individuals that politics is not only the domain of the old. Rather, to the contrary, quotas would signal to young adults that politics is an area where their participation is encouraged and supported. While we are doubtful that many parties will engage in this path, we deem it the only quick fix to rectify the underrepresentation of young people in the European Parliament, and possibly elsewhere as well.
On a more general note, we need more studies tackling (the lack of) young people's representation. Not only do we know relatively little about the factors that could potentially increase youth representation, we know even less about the factors surrounding young people gaining candidacy status. Are some types of parties more likely to nominate more candidates than others? Based on the results of the election of young deputies to the EP, we doubt that there is huge variation within parties. Nevertheless, to confirm this conjecture, future research should look at young politicians as candidates to elected office. Yet, and while there is still abundant research on young people in politics to do, we have shown that differences in types of parties and their nomination procedures do not explain any substantial variation in the age of parliamentarians in the EP.

On a more general note, we need more studies tackling (the lack of) young people's representation. Not only do we know relatively little about the factors that could potentially increase youth representation, we know even less about the factors surrounding young people gaining candidacy status.

Notes
1 Historically, there are numerous examples where the younger generations were described as unfit for holding office. For instance, Plato believed that the philosophical maturity of individuals was reached after the age of fifty (McKee/Barber 2001).
2 To illustrate this point, being from an ethnic minority group is a feature that seldom changes for an individual. Gender identity is mutable for some individuals and, similarly, economic standing is a group characteristic from which some individuals shift during their lifespan. As a contrast, the shifting of age is inevitable; being young is a characteristic that is temporary from an individual's perspective.
3 Forthcoming work by the authors, building on representatives’ roll-call votes since 2016 on issues relating to environmental legislation.

4 For a theoretical discussion of the benefits of higher youth representation, see Henn et al. 2002; Tremmel et al. 2015.

5 Paxton and Hughes (2016) make a similar argument when it comes to the representation of women.

6 A prerequisite of our large-n study is that we discuss processes of candidacy, yet we study observational data on the final outcomes of these processes: the MEPs that are successful in getting elected.

7 We do not include independents in our data-sample. Our data mainly stems from national parties, but, of course, there are also some MEPs from regional parties, such as the German Christian Social Union. See the Online Appendix on www.igjr.org for a list of the parties, with their English names.

8 To further gauge that the three dimensions are distinct, we run a correlation analysis and find a medium-strong correlation between the economic and the value dimension (the Pearson Correlation Coefficient is .59), a rather weak correlation between the pro-/anti-EU dimension and value dimension (the Pearson Correlation Coefficients are .32) and no correlation between the pro-/anti-EU dimension and the economic dimension (the Pearson Correlation Coefficient is .02).

9 In their dataset, no information exists on parties in Croatia, which is therefore excluded in these models. To test for the appropriateness of OLS, we first check for normality. Appendix 1 highlights that the age of EU parliamentarians is nearly perfectly normally distributed; there are also no outliers, which is a sign of homoscedasticity.

11 If we add country dummies or fixed effects, the effect of the independent variables becomes even smaller.

12 If we add country dummies or fixed effects, the effect of the independent variables becomes even smaller.

References


Appendix

Appendix 1: The distribution of the dependent variable, the age of MEPs on the day of the election

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Is there a sound democratic case for raising the membership of young people in political parties and trade unions through descriptive representation?

by Thomas Tozer

Abstract: Young people are seriously under-represented in both political parties and trade unions. I argue that a dependent conception of democracy interested in substantive equality, not merely formal equality, would support addressing this problem through descriptive representation. The essay begins by considering the requirements of democracy, and whether these can support a case for descriptive representation. Although descriptive representation entails democratic costs, there is a contingent case for group representation that is consistent with the aims of democracy. Young people, moreover, satisfy this case in terms of membership of political parties – but less so in the case of trade unions. Finally, the essay considers practical methods for improving young people’s representation in these.

Keywords: Democracy, Descriptive representation, Substantive equality, Political parties, Trade unions

Introduction

Membership of a political party or a trade union bestows a form of power upon the member, giving her an opportunity to influence politics. Indeed, members often exert significant influence on the party. Depending on its rules, members might select or help to select the party’s candidates or leaders. They may present new suggestions for policy, as well as sharing views which reflect those of the electorate – an oft-cited benefit of membership for the party is that it will gain from policy ideas which mirror the needs and wishes of the electorate, with the members acting like scouts for these (Kölln/Polk 2017: 20). Finally, party membership is often a requirement for standing for a party position, and thus for gaining political office: future politicians will arise from the respective membership bases of parties. Similarly, by joining a trade union – an organisation of workers who have come together to protect and improve their employment conditions – it becomes possible to affect its agenda and priorities, suggest new ideas, bring the views of the electorate to bear on its policies, and so forth. In particular, membership of a trade union allows the member to influence her own and others’ working conditions, such as their wages, pensions and holiday allowance, by influencing what the trade union itself is seeking, and how it intends to obtain it. Moreover, political parties and trade unions function as a link between the electorate and the government, safeguarding the legitimacy of the latter by ensuring that it is responsive to the concerns of the former (Keman 2014; see also Dalton et al. 2011; Müller/Katz 1997). Trade unions, on the other hand, function to look after the interests of workers, and to protect them from exploitation or maltreatment at the hands of their employer.

It is therefore obvious that the extent to which different groups are represented in political parties and trade unions will have important political implications. There are certain groups the under-representation of which would raise concerns about whether the group’s voice is being heard in the representative assembly, and its views and interests adequately represented; i.e. which would have implications for representative democracy.

There are certain groups the under-representation of which would raise concerns about whether the group’s voice is being heard in the representative assembly, and its views and interests adequately represented.

Young people are such a group. Data from two European surveys, from the late 1980s to 2000s, reveal a gap between the age of party members and of the general population that has been present for a long time, but which has grown larger in recent decades (Scarrow/Gezgor 2010: 829f.). A general tendency for membership of political parties to decline has been present across most European countries, but it has hit the young – who are often the first to express frustration with the political system – especially hard (Bruter/Harrison 2009: 1260f.). Consider the UK, for example. Among the UK’s main political parties, only a very small percentage of members are less than 25 years old: in 1990, the percentage ranged from 1% of the Conservatives to 12% of the Green Party (Davis 1990: 101). More recent figures on the membership of British political parties, according to a recent study, are no less alarming: though 18-24 year-olds make up about one-tenth of the population, they make up just one-twentieth of the membership base of the four biggest political parties – Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and the SNP – varying between 4% of Labour’s membership base and 6% of the Liberal Democrats’. This age-group, in comparison to others, makes up by far the smallest proportion these parties’ members. In contrast, over-65s make up about 18% of the UK population but comprise 44% of Conservative members and around 30% of the other parties’ membership bases. As the authors of the study write: “None of the parties…has got that much to write home about when it comes to young people.” (Bale et al. 2018: 8f.)

Similarly, while union membership has been in significant decline over the past three decades (The Economist 2015), it has declined disproportionately among the young and now stands at a particularly low level for this group. For example, in the UK in autumn 2000, union membership stood at 10% of 16-24 year-old workers, compared with 30% of workers aged 25-65. Figures from 1983 show that this gap has widened: back then, the rate in Britain was 34% within the first group and 54% within the second. In 1975 the respective figures were 43% and 58% (Blanden/Machin 2003: 393). In 2015 just 9% of workers aged 16-24 were
This essay asks whether the under-representation of young people in political parties and trade unions poses a democratic problem and, if so, how it should be addressed.

This essay asks whether the under-representation of young people in political parties and trade unions poses a democratic problem and, if so, how it should be addressed. It begins by examining the requirements of democracy and considering whether descriptive representation, which requires that representatives are from the descriptive or “group” that they represent, would support these requirements. I argue that although descriptive representation entails democratic costs, there is a contingent (or “contextual”) case for descriptive or “group” representation that is consistent with the aims of democracy. Young people, moreover, satisfy this case; and the case also holds for membership of political parties and trade unions. The essay concludes by considering what actions are thereby required by democracy in order to boost the membership of young people in political parties and trade unions.

What is required by democracy?

Democracy was defined by Rousseau (2008 [1762]: 67) as the political form that arises when the whole, or the majority, of government power is bestowed upon the people. In a similar vein, Phillips (1995: 27-30) distinguishes two principles of democracy: popular control and popular equality. The first requires that it is “the people” who control politics; government must not only be “for the people” but also “by the people”. The second requires that every citizen must have an equal level of power to determine political outcomes, as expressed by the old dictum “one person, one vote”; the days of John Stuart Mill’s proposals of multiple votes for the more educated are long gone. Equality, therefore, is the basis of a democratic division of power (Brown 1950: 47). “No system”, Phillips (1995: 27) writes, “can claim to be democratic if it does not recognize the legitimacy of these two goals”. The two principles can in fact be collapsed into one: political power – i.e. the ability to make political decisions – must be held by all citizens in equal measure. This is the most fundamental principle of democracy.

Yet in that raw form, this principle leaves open an important question: should democracy be concerned only that the formal institutions and systems of democracy bestowed equal political power upon all citizens, or should it be concerned with the distribution of political power more generally? The two prongs of this question correspond to two conceptions of democracy, as distinguished by Dworkin (1987: 3-8): a dependent conception, and a detached conception. According to the first, the consequences of political institutions and processes for the substantive equality of citizens must be considered at the same time as questions of whether the institutions and processes themselves distribute power equally. The best form of democracy is one that is as well-placed as possible to produce decisions which treat all citizens as equally important. According to the second, all that matters is that there is formal equality, i.e. that power over political decisions is distributed equally – the institutions and processes of democracy give every citizen an equal stake in decision-making. The results of these decisions are irrelevant.

As Dworkin explains, the dependent conception regards the best form of democracy as determined by an “output test”: it favours whatever form is “most conducive to advancing or protecting these substantive egalitarian goals…[and] is most likely to produce the substantive decisions and results that treat all members of the community with equal concern”; it regards the consequences of these decisions as crucial. The detached conception, on the other hand, regards the best form of democracy as determined by an “input test”: if forced to decide between different democratic processes, it favours whichever “is best calculated to improve equality of political power still further”, but ignores the consequences of these processes or of the decisions made by them (Dworkin 1987: 3-5).

The normal presumption is in favour of the detached conception: equal voting power among citizens, and hence majority rule, is commonly held as the fundamental principle of democracy; anything that counts against it (and against majority rule) is considered anti-democratic. The “apparent neutrality” (Dworkin 1987: 7) [my emphasis] of this conception of democracy also makes it particularly appealing. But, of course, this neutrality does not ensure neutrality of outcome. If, for example, voters hold some preferences that are based on sexist or racist sentiments, then the “neutral” apparatus of democracy will simply mirror these preferences in the composition of its representatives.

Narrowly following a normative principle is folly if doing so will lead to an outcome that undermines that principle’s aims, i.e. that undermines the deeper principle(s) underlying that principle.

Though there is not space here to treat the tension between these two conceptions of democracy with the thoroughness it deserves, and that it receives from Dworkin, let me offer a brief argument in favour of the dependent conception. Narrowly following a normative principle is folly if doing so will lead to an outcome that undermines that principle’s aims, i.e. that undermines the deeper principle(s) underlying that principle. Thus it would be folly, for example, to follow the principle “you should feed your children meat” in order to fulfil the principle “you should ensure that your children are healthy”, if we knew that for some reason the meat we were feeding our children would actually make them unhealthy.

Consider the democratic principle that political institutions must distribute political decision-making power equally. This principle is followed, I suggest, because it is believed to be the best way to ensure that everyone has an equal stake in the political process (for example, by having one vote each), rather than some people having more political decision-making power than others. In other words, it is followed on the basis that it is the best way to ensure political power is held equally by all citizens. What this implies is that the principle “political institutions must distribute political power equally” is underpinned by the (deeper) principle that political power must be held equally by all citizens: that is the more fundamental principle of democracy. It is that latter principle which motivates the former one. But if this is the case, then it would make no sense to follow the former while neglecting the latter. Rather, the latter must take precedence. If a tension arises between the two principles, we must prioritise the deeper princi-
ple that political power must be held equally by all citizens. Since this motivating principle is the guiding principle of the dependent conception, and the motivated principle – that political institutions must bestow equal political decision-making power on all citizens – is the guiding principle of the detached conception, it therefore follows that we should favour the dependent conception over the detached conception. Thus, we should adhere to a principle of substantive equality (i.e. actual equality of political power), rather than merely formal equality.

Thus, we should adhere to a principle of substantive equality, rather than merely formal equality.

Democracy is also endorsed as a good method for promoting people’s substantive interests – such as in peace, prosperity and liberty (Kolodny 2014: 199-202). In short, the idea is that by giving people ownership of political decision-making, democratic political decisions (as opposed to non-democratic decisions) are more likely to be the ones that will best further people’s substantive interests. Perhaps furthering people’s substantive interests could not be considered a requirement of democracy as such, but rather an (absolutely fundamental) aim of democracy. A democracy that successfully promoted prosperity would mutatis mutandis be considered a “better democracy” than one that did not, but it would probably not thereby be considered any more democratic. But this distinction is not especially relevant here: for our purposes, we can add “furthering people’s substantive interests” to the requirements of democracy. In conclusion, then, democracy is required for two things: to promote substantive equality, and to promote people’s substantive interests.

Democracy vs descriptive representation
The specific form of representation relevant to our purposes is descriptive or mirror representation. This form of representation requires that the representative shares some of the essential characteristics of the group that she represents, such as shared experiences and/or physical identity. Thus, women should be represented by women, blacks by blacks, the working class by the working class, and so forth. The ideal of descriptive representation, coined “microcosmic representation” by Birch (1971: 17; 1975: 56), is that the representative assembly should reflect, in exact proportions, the socio-demographic divisions within society – it should be the entire citizenry in microcosm. Arguments for descriptive representation have carried considerable weight over the past few centuries. In the American revolution ary period, John Adams argued that the representative assembly should be “an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large”, and the seminal 19th-century utilitarians Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill all espoused an essentially microcosmic conception of representation (Adams 1856; Judge 1999: 23-30; Birch 1971: 53-55).

Descriptive representation and the methods to achieve it, such as quotas, are often taken to conflict with democratic ideals however, such as the principle that every citizen should have an equal opportunity to run for office. This conflict is crucial for us to resolve, because if descriptive representation necessarily contradicts the principles of democracy then there cannot be a democratic case for descriptive representation of young people in political parties and trade unions. My answer: although descriptive representation may contradict some democratic principles, the conception of democracy sketched above means that a democratic case for descriptive representation will stand so long as the overall effect of descriptive representation is to further substantive equality and promote people’s substantive interests. When would we expect it to do so? There are numerous possible cases. Although the members of a particular group in society may be politically marginalised or have interests that can only be addressed through policy (both of which could potentially be addressed through descriptive representation), they might also not be represented because, for example, they lack the confidence to stand for office; or they may be ill-informed about how to stand for office; or they may not have the educational attainments necessary to persuade people to vote for them. In such cases, descriptive representation might, overall, function effectively to promote substantive equality and substantive interests.

The equal political power bestowed on them by the political institutions will not translate into equal political power more generally.

Perhaps the most commonly discussed case however, which arguably entails some (or even all) of these, is when there is an unequal structure of power within society that effectively prevents a particular group standing for office. Very often, this structure of power is invisible, potentially creating a “glass ceiling” for the group. As a result of this unequal power structure, the group does not receive the political support it needs and deserves, even though the political institutions may bestow on them the same level of political power (i.e. one person, one vote; the right of every individual to run for office; etc.) as on everyone else in society. For example, if the members of a minority group are regarded by most to be “second-class citizens” due to an underlying racism in society, and if they are poorer and less well educated than the rest of society, then formal equality will not be enough for them: invisible barriers to running for office, such as lacking the knowledge of how to stand for office, and invisible barriers to being voted in, such as the racist preferences of most of the electorate, will mean that the equal political power bestowed on them by the political institutions will not translate into equal political power more generally.

This is especially true in cases of intersectionality: when someone belongs to more than one marginalised group. For example, if homosexuals and white people were marginalised, then white homosexuals would suffer from the dual effects of these two unequal power structures. They may experience a unique form of marginalisation that is different from the sum of the marginalisation experienced by whites and homosexuals. If particularly bad, this group (white homosexuals) might therefore merit descriptive representation. The extent to which different groups will have a case for descriptive representation is contingent, however: it will depend upon the particular groups and the political context in question. Broadly speaking, the case for the descriptive representation of a group will hinge on whether such representation will further substantive equality and substantive interests. But that leaves us with a tricky question: when would it do so? Answering that is the task of the next section.
Which groups?

There are innumerable groups in society that could be candidates for descriptive representation: gingers, Protestants, blacks, homosexuals, women, gypsies, left-handers, cyclists, disabled people, fat people, young people, etc. The difficulty in determining precisely which groups require descriptive presentation and why is often taken to be a very serious issue for descriptive representation — or even to be dispositive (Mansbridge 1999: 634). But it is not insurmountable. There are clearly principles to be uncovered regarding which groups should be represented, because it is immediately obvious that while there would be a good case for the descriptive representation of some of these groups, such as women, for others, such as gingers, there would not.

Young (1990: 186f.) argues that we should represent oppressed social groups, not interest groups or ideological groups. "Once we are clear that the principle of group representation refers only to oppressed social groups," she writes, "then the fear of an unworkable proliferation of group representation should dissipate."

There are innumerable groups in society that could be candidates for descriptive representation: gingers, Protestants, blacks, homosexuals, women, gypsies, left-handers, cyclists, disabled people, fat people, young people, etc.

Beyond this, however, Young does not offer any philosophical criteria by which it could be determined precisely which groups should be represented, claiming rather that no philosophical argument could resolve this problem and so the application of her normative principle should be rough and ready. Ultimately, she claims, it should depend upon the context: any principle that is devised should be subject to revision if conditions change (Young 1990: 190). For example, the Catholic-Protestant cleavage was so salient that it required political representation in the 19th and early 20th century. Now that cleavage has faded, but new groups have emerged with their own particular cases for descriptive representation (Young 1998).

Not only is Iris M. Young's account fuzzy on the details, however, her list of "oppressed groups" (1989: 261) in the US includes about 80% of the population! As Kymlicka (1995: 145) points out, that puts into serious doubt Young's claim that her conception avoids an "unworkable proliferation" of different groups requiring descriptive representation.

Mansbridge takes a more direct approach. "The primary function of representative democracy," she suggests, "is to represent the substantive interests of the represented through both deliberation and aggregation [voting]" (Mansbridge 1999: 630). Thus, the case for descriptive representation should be judged against this criterion; and it is democracy's deliberative function that requires descriptive representation far more than its aggregative function (Mansbridge 1999: 629).

Mansbridge's conclusion is that there are two contexts in which descriptive representation will so improve deliberation: when a disadvantaged group mistrusts society, and when the expression of a group's interests and views is uncrystallised, descriptive representation will improve communication and add experiential knowledge. There are also two contexts in which descriptive representation will further goals unrelated to representation (i.e. un-related to either deliberation or aggregation): when a group has historically been politically subordinate, descriptive representation creates a social meaning of "ability to rule"; and when a group has historically been discriminated against, descriptive representation will increase the group's attachment to the policy; and thus improve their perception of its legitimacy (Mansbridge 1999).

Yet Mansbridge's view strikes me as being overly complex while at the same time giving an insufficient account of which groups should be represented and why. There are surely cases outside of Mansbridge's four that would justify descriptive representation. For example, what about a group whose concerns have historically been misrepresented? Mansbridge's criteria also fail to get to the heart of why certain groups merit descriptive representation. Her four cases, though related, are distinct in a way that leaves the reader wondering exactly what they have in common. Certainly she goes some way towards explaining this — the first two will both improve deliberation, for example — but at the same time, a deeper question remains unanswered: why should we be concerned with improving deliberation only with respect to the needs of these particular groups?

Two criteria

There are, I suggest, two criteria for representation which underpin both Young's and Mansbridge's stabs at which groups should be represented. This is my own attempt at answering the question: the democratic case for descriptive representation holds for those groups which have (1) unique concerns that are significant (2) where those concerns stand to be affected by the actions of the elected representative body. These two conditions are, I contend, jointly necessary and sufficient for a case for descriptive representation.

Numbers alone do not matter. Phillips (1995: 21), for example, decries the "injustice" and "democratic deficit" implied by women making up just 5% of the legislature, and claims that in such a context the case for descriptive representation, which Phillips calls the "politics of presence", appears beyond question. But in fact, the under-representation of a social group to this extent is not, by itself, sufficient for concern. For example, imagine that just 5% of the legislature can roll their tongue, even though tongue-rollers comprise 50% of the population — this would be the same ratio of percentage presence in the population to percentage presence in parliament (50:5) as in the case of women, but it would not be of concern. Why? The reason, I suggest, is that tongue-rollers do not meet either of the two criteria. They have no significant unique concerns, and, even if they did, there is nothing much that politics could do about them — there is no drug that can alter whether or not someone is able to roll their tongue that the state could sponsor. Women, on the other hand, clearly meet both: they have significant unique concerns — for example on particular issues such as maternity leave and abortion — and these concerns stand to be affected by political action — for example, legislation could
The wording “stand to be affected by” of the second criterion is important. To justify descriptive representation, it does not have to be the case that the concerns of the group will necessarily benefit from political action, as such. Indeed, for an issue such as abortion it is not clear what it would mean for women to benefit from political action, because the correct policy on abortion is something that is hotly disputed among women. The point is rather that because such an issue will be significantly affected by politics, and because women stand to be uniquely affected by it, women should be able to stand in the political assembly and represent their unique concerns on the issue. This is necessary in order that the substantive equality of men and women, and the substantive interests of society, are supported — i.e. that the aims of democracy are fulfilled.

The democratic case for descriptive representation holds for those groups which have (1) unique concerns that are significant (2) where those concerns stand to be affected by the actions of the elected representative body.

Indeed, as Phillips argues, women may have diverse opinions on childcare and abortion, but this does not render these issues gender-neutral (1995: 67-71). On the contrary, they are issues that are profoundly more relevant to women than to men, and the argument for the “presence” of women in parliament does not depend on all women sharing the same viewpoint, but only on the fact that the interests of women and men are distinct. I should also add that it is not necessary for the group itself to express the concern(s) of criterion (1). Consider Mansbridge’s case of a group that mistrusts the polity, for example: such a group thereby has a unique, and significant, concern (its level of trust in the polity), but it may not itself recognise this mistrust as a “concern”. Finally, let me add that the term “unique concerns” should have some degree of stretch: if there are significant concerns that affect a particular group more than any other group, then that group meets the first criterion pro tanto.

Thus, when Mansbridge and Young propose theoretical categories for determining which particular groups should be represented, these categories are in fact merely examples of groups that tick both these boxes. Take “groups who have uncrystallised interests”: if such a group did not have any unique concerns, then its lack of clarity on these issues would not be democratically problematic because the policies that others would prefer are just as likely to fit the preferences of this group as any other group; and if they had unique concerns but these did not stand to be affected by the actions of the political assembly, then there would be no point in worrying about their political representation.

My argument for why we should reduce the case for groups requiring descriptive representation to these two criteria is two-fold. First, the attempts to answer “which groups should be descriptively represented?” by Mansbridge and Young seem to be accounted for by these two criteria; and the two criteria themselves are both simpler and more concise than the proposals of either Mansbridge or Young.

Second, more fundamentally, these two criteria follow logically from an appreciation of the very purpose of descriptive representation, as I have presented it in this essay: to promote substantive equality, and to further democracy’s ability to promote people’s substantive interests. Descriptive representation of the groups that meet my two criteria will ensure that decision-making power is held by all relevant groups which are: the groups which actually have important “group concerns” to be represented (determined by criterion one — i.e. by the fact that the group actually has concerns which are unique to it and which are important enough to merit representation), given that political representation of these concerns would be worthwhile (determined by criterion two — i.e. by the fact that would be no point in giving a group political representation if doing so could not have any impact on that group’s concerns). Thus, by preventing political neglect of all the relevant groups, the two criteria will further substantive equality (the first requirement of democracy, as I have laid it out); and by ensuring that the relevant groups are given a voice in the representative assembly, the two criteria will increase the likelihood that policy decisions will be made which further their substantive interests (the second requirement of democracy). The two criteria themselves simply determine what the “relevant” groups are. It is worth noting, moreover, that the case for descriptive representation sketched above, about how descriptive representation may be necessary in order to tackle an unequal power structure in society, is accounted for by the two criteria, because a group that is uniquely suffering from an unequal power structure is precisely the sort of group that would meet the criteria.

To the extent that a certain group fulfils the criteria, the case for descriptive representation of that group is, I contend, pro tanto strong. For example, if the group’s concerns are completely unique to that group, very important, and stand to be affected significantly by political action, then that group has a very strong case for descriptive representation. Thus, like Mansbridge and Young, I propose a contingent (or “contextual”) case for descriptive representation that will vary according to the conditions of the time and to the group under consideration. Hence, to return to our original question, whether the underrepresentation of young people in political parties and trade unions is a democratic problem depends on whether, and to what extent, they meet these two criteria.

Let me close this section by giving an example of descriptive representation that clearly met these two criteria and which, hence, has succeeded in furthering both substantive equality and people’s substantive interests: the representation of women in South Africa. As detailed above, women clearly meet both criteria very strongly. And the increased representation of women in South Africa has led to significant legislative amendments and additions on issues such as abortion and employment equality, and can even...
be credited with the 1998 Domestic Violence Bill (Devlin/Elgie 2008: 240). It is self-evident that such legislative effects will further substantive equality and substantive interests. More generally, although the impact in African countries of greater female presence in parliament has been to some extent mixed, in large part the less successful cases have been due to factors that prevent successful descriptive representation, such as women representatives feeling that they must toe the party line, rather than the ineffectiveness of descriptive representation itself (Devlin/Elgie 2008: 240) (I respond to a related worry below: “Discouraging ‘we-thinking’ and harming deliberation”).

Objections

Before we consider whether young people meet the two criteria, there are a number of strong and popular objections to descriptive representation that I should consider, some of which are directly concerned with its impact on democracy.

Accountability

Accountability is an essential piece of apparatus in any system of representative democracy, because it is accountability – the possibility of being held to account at the ballot box – which keeps representatives responsive to the people they represent. Therefore, if descriptive representation damages accountability, this would be a serious democratic issue. Why would it do so? Mansbridge (1999: 640) puts the problem very clearly: “The descriptive characteristics of a representative can lull voters into thinking their substantive interests are being represented even when this is not the case”. She quotes a black representative speaking to Carol Swain: “One of the advantages, and disadvantages, of representing blacks is their shameless loyalty to their incumbents. You can almost get away with raping babies and be forgiven. You don’t have any vigilance about your performance” (Swain 1993: 73, cited in Mansbridge 1999: 640).

If descriptive representation damages accountability, this would be a serious democratic issue.

However, this problem can be reduced if more descriptive representatives compete for the post, and are seen within the assembly, enabling voters to weigh the virtues of different potential descriptive representatives against each other (Mansbridge 1999: 640f.). For example, the fact that some African American groups, such as the Congressional Black Caucus, did not endorse Clarence Thomas’s nomination to the Supreme Court in 1991, despite his descriptive identity, was an indication that black representatives had become sufficiently commonplace that the black community no longer felt that they needed to support black candidates no matter what (Mansbridge 1999: 640f.; Swain 1992). Indeed, so long as there are even just two candidates standing for the same position we would expect voters to compare them, and for these two candidates to therefore compete over who will best represent the concerns of the group being represented. The conclusion, then, is that in order to avoid a loss of accountability there must be at least two descriptive candidates standing for a particular position in the representative assembly. From this perspective, the more the better.

Discouraging “we-thinking” and harming deliberation

An essential part of a functioning democracy is deliberation. Successful deliberation involves the deliberators being prepared to alter their preferences as they reflect on the different points of view under discussion, and this in turn depends on “we-thinking” rather than “I-thinking”. If deliberators think in this way then solutions which were impossible before become possible; and without it, individualism can dominate, as a result of which no shared vision of the political community is possible (Mansbridge 1992: 36f.; Elstain 1981: 246).

The worry is that descriptive representation encourages representatives to argue for the policies that are best for their group, rather than to reflect honestly on the policies that are best, and fairest, for society as a whole. This worry is exacerbated by claims that people from outside a group cannot, or even should not try, to empathise with the needs of, and represent, that group. For example, Baines (1992: 56, cited in Kymlicka 1993: 67), making the case for the descriptive representation of women, claims that representation can occur fully only when the representative shares the identity of the represented group: she rejects the notion that a man can, or should try to, represent the interests of a woman. Similarly, Phillips (1995: 76) contends that “no amount of thought or sympathy, no matter how careful or honest, can jump the barriers of experience”. Arguments such as Baines’s and Phillips’s, which often underpin arguments for descriptive representation, can discourage people from even attempting to empathise with members of other groups by suggesting that such empathy is impossible.

In contrast, by pursuing a shared conception of the common good without being directly held to the views and concerns of any particular group, in a context that respects the basic norms of equity and the democratic process, effective deliberation becomes absolutely possible (Phillips 1995: 155-160; Parkinson 2004: 380f.; Cohen/Rogers 1992: 420). Descriptive representation can therefore be seen as an impediment to democratic deliberation. The first thing to note here is that the above argument for why descriptive representation threatens accountability, and this argument for why it causes representatives to be fixed to the views of their group, point in opposite directions. The concern must either be that descriptive representation will lead the representative to do what he wants and ignore the needs and views of his group, or that it will lead the representative’s opinions to be fixed to these in a way that will harm deliberation. It cannot cut both ways.

This itself shows that these two objections to descriptive representation are based on shaky ground. For each, the likelihood of being true counts against the likelihood of the other being true. The sensible conclusion, therefore, seems to be that neither is inevitable, nor even especially likely. With respect to the worry that deliberation will be harmed, my answer is simply that descriptive representatives should be encouraged to bring the concerns and views of their group to the debate, but to nonetheless prioritise the common good – reaching a set of policies that treat everyone as equals – above the welfare of that group alone. This would allow representatives the autonomy to deliberate successfully, while ensuring that the concerns of their group are taken into account. The objection that representatives would be unable to empathise...
with the concerns of those not from their group strikes me as both false and harmful: as Kymlicka (1995: 140) argues, to the extent that there are limits to our ability to empathise with other groups, we should try to fight against those limitations – not blithely accept them. Thus, although there is a danger that descriptive representation might cause a loss of accountability or harm deliberation, it seems just as likely that it may do no such thing; and by encouraging representatives to act in the way just suggested, both pitfalls can be avoided.

Selection by lot and loss of talent

Another problem is the practical question of how the goals of descriptive representation could be achieved. Actual microcosmic representation, for which the proportions in which different socio-demographic groups make up the populace is exactly replicated in the representative assembly, would be almost impossible to achieve unless the representative assembly was chosen by a controlled random sample, using selection by lot (as was, in fact, practised in ancient Greece), or comprised of volunteers (Birch 1971: 57f.; Burnheim 1985: 110-113). But as Birch (2001: 97) argues, this hardly seems sensible or fair when the job in question necessitates particular talents and brings with it a high degree of insecurity.

However, as Mansbridge points out, this criticism holds weight only against microcosmic representation – something that few contemporary theorists actually defend. Microcosmic representation would indeed entail a huge sacrifice in talent, and it would incur the problems mentioned above of abandoning accountability since representatives would no longer be authorised by, and thereby would not be accountable to, the people they represent (Kymlicka 1995: 139). Those are both very strong reasons to reject the case for microcosmic representation.

Having done so, without having given up the general case for descriptive representation, we are left with what Mansbridge (1999: 632) calls “selective” descriptive representation, according to which “institutional design gives selected groups greater descriptive representation than they would achieve in existing electoral systems in order to bring the proportions of those groups in the legislature closer to their percentages in the population”. This is the type of descriptive representation that I am arguing for in this essay. The assumption here is that the group is as capable of representing itself as any other, and is not suffering from a lack of selection due to any factor that relates to how well members of that group could engage in political representation, but rather due to some structural factor.

So the trenchant counter-example to descriptive representation of “lunatics representing lunatics” is not relevant here (Mansbridge 1999: 633). Hence there is only a very minimal chance that descriptive representation will lead to a loss in talent.

Quotas

The question remains of how selective descriptive representation is to be achieved. Quotas are perhaps the most common way of achieving selective descriptive representation. In actual fact, quotas could not be applied to membership in political parties and trade unions, for purely practical reasons; but as one of the key methods of descriptive representation, they are worth considering in order that we can ask what the costs of achieving descriptive representation would normally be. At the end of this essay we will consider a number of less conventional methods for achieving selective descriptive representation that would be applicable to membership of political parties and trade unions.

Quotas are perhaps the most common way of achieving selective descriptive representation...The worry is that quotas entail serious democratic costs.

The worry is that quotas entail serious democratic costs. In particular, Rehfeld argues that methods such as quotas, which make particular characteristics or beliefs a required qualification for people to be able to vote for that person, undermine two presumptive democratic rights: “the right of citizens to run for any office that stands to make and enforce law over them; and the right of citizens to choose whomever they want to fill those offices”. And these, Rehfeld contends, are the very principles that make representative government a legitimate form of democratic self-rule (2009: 239).

Yet given a dependent conception of democracy, quotas can be seen as tools that can be justified from a democratic perspective even though they incur these democratic costs, so long as their net effect is to further the fundamental aims of democracy. The question of whether quotas can be justified on democratic grounds is therefore contingent: it depends on whether the quota will, in the given context, benefit democracy to an extent that outweighs these democratic harms.

Essentialism

The final objection to descriptive representation that is considered here is essentialism: the worry that descriptive representation relies on a false assumption that groups have an inward “essential” nature, and unified views, which could therefore be represented by any member of that group. This can lead to the sorts of difficulty which we saw above, in which it is claimed that only the members of a group can understand its concerns; or it might lead to an essentialising of that group’s concerns, and a consequent neglect of the diversity of opinions within that group.

However, there is simply no reason why descriptive representation has to fall victim to this false assumption. As argued above, the case for descriptive representation does not depend upon the members of a group all sharing the same view, but only on the fact that that group has unique concerns.

Conclusion

If my responses to the above objections have been sound, then these objections are not quite as devastating as they first appear. Indeed, the only objection that has truly been left standing is Rehfeld’s complaint that (in my words) using certain instruments of descriptive representation, such as quotas, goes against democratic principles. It is primarily against this objection, then, that I shall later defend my case.

Do young people qualify?

Based on the argument made above, a case for descriptive
representation of young people will stand if, and only if, they meet the two criteria. I will now argue that young people fulfil both.

Criterion (1)
Young people, in general, face a number of concerns that are specific to them (Howker/Malik: 2013; Martin: 2012; Davis: 1990). But the current generation of young people, in particular, called the “jilted generation” by Howker and Malik, face a number of especially pressing concerns (Howker/Malik 2013: 202, 240, 263). Indeed, the 20th century saw young people increasingly being singled out as a group that required its own special treatment, and it became increasingly commonplace to hear the “youth problem” being discussed (Davis 1990). Let us consider some two specific examples from the UK: student debt and housing. With respect to both of these important issues, young people have significant, unique concerns. To consider student debt first: in 2010, tuition fees were tripled, from £3,000 to £9,000, by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. In England, at the time of writing, they are fixed at £9,250. In 2002 Margaret Hodge, the higher education minister, justified raising tuition fees on the logic that a degree enables a graduate to earn, on average, an extra £400,000 over his or her lifetime. Since then, this figure has been deployed repeatedly by those who support the higher fees. Yet according to more recent research, that figure is more like £100,000. According to a study by the Intergenerational Foundation, even this figure is too high; but the study also points out that that even if the figure is correct, it cannot cover the interest being applied to student loans (Kemp-King 2016). As a result of these huge fees, students are now leaving university with an average of £50,000 in debt (Belfield et al. 2017). And this figure will rise quickly, due to high interest rates. In contrast, previous generations enjoyed free university education, without having to accrue any debt whatsoever. Thus, young people are uniquely faced with the burden of high tuition fees and mountainous student debt.

Let us consider some two specific examples from the UK: student debt and housing. With respect to both of these important issues, young people have significant, unique concerns.

Young people also face unique, significant concerns in terms of housing. Compared to previous generations, they are likely to spend longer renting privately and living with their parents (Rugg/Quilgars 2015: 5). Indeed, England has seen home-ownership decline among the young for a number of years. In 15 years, the proportion of under-35s within the home-owner population has dropped by almost half; and the ownership rate of young people on low/middle incomes fell from 56% in 1998 to 25% in 2013-2014 (Corlett et al. 2016: 36f.). The Institute for Fiscal Studies (Cribb et al. 2018) recently released a report that clearly shows the difference in home-owning prospects between the young today and previous generations of young people; of 25-34 year-olds whose incomes were within the middle 20% for their age, 65% owned their own home in 1995-96. Yet by 2015-16, it was just 27%. This significant drop in house-ownership, which can be explained by the rise in house prices over the past few years, represents a serious obstacle for young people.

Young people also face pressing democratic concerns. In the UK, the likelihood of feeling a civic duty to vote is much lower for young people than for the rest of the population. According to statistics from 2012, 45% of young people feel a duty to vote; this is in contrast to an average of 62% across the population, and a level of 73% for those aged 65 and above (Lee/Young 2014). And in the UK in 2011-12, 42% of young people aged 16-24 stated that they had no interest at all in politics, compared with half this figure – 21% – for those aged 65 and above (Randall 2014). Relatedly, recent UK elections have seen a significantly lower turnout among the young than among older voters. In 2010, 44% of 18-24 year-olds turned out to vote, compared to 76% of those aged 65 and over (Ipsos MORI 2010). In 2015, the corresponding turnout rates were 43% and 78%, and in 2017 they were 54% and 71% (Ipsos MORI 2015, 2017). Moreover, this tendency seems to have become part of a vicious circle in which the young do not vote, vote-seeking politicians therefore ignore their concerns, and young people therefore feel ignored and so do not vote etc. (Sloam 2007: 565; Birch et al. 2013: 16, 20; Lijphart 1997: 4; Tozer 2016: 18f.).

It is therefore plain that young people strongly fulfil the first criterion: they have a number of significant, unique concerns. The fact that the young also face certain democratic concerns, such as low voter turnout, lends particular weight to the democratic case for descriptive representation.11

Criterion (2)
These concerns clearly stand to be affected by the actions of the elected representative body. With respect to the democratic concerns faced by young people, the vicious circle of young people’s under-representation in politics will start to reverse if their representation in politics increases: increased political representation could trigger a virtuous circle that encourages the representative assembly to decide on policies which are fair to young people, in turn encouraging more young people to vote. In this way, it would help to further substantive equality between the young and other age-groups.

More specifically, in terms of the two issues young people face that I have just expanded on – student debt and housing – there is no doubt that these stand to be affected by political action. It was the actions of successive governments that led to tuition fees being introduced in the first place and then increasing a number of times; and governments have been choosing to continue not to change or reverse such policies. That such a reversal is possible is demonstrated by the Labour party’s proposed policy of abolishing tuition fees entirely. And on housing, there are clearly government policies that could improve young people’s prospects. David Willetts, formerly a Conservative minister and now chair of the Resolution Foundation, a think tank, says: “We do need to accept that there’s a very important role for the public sector in getting houses built. It can’t all be done by private housebuilders…On this, I am completely non-ideological” (quoted in Eaton 2018: 24). That would remedy a housing shortage, but it also implies a
prospective solution to the high house prices faced by the young: reducing prices by introducing publicly-owned houses at a much more affordable price.

Therefore, the second criterion is undoubtedly fulfilled: the young face a number of significant unique concerns (including many which have not been given here) that stand to be greatly affected by political action.

There are powerful concerns that are almost completely unique to young people, and which stand to be affected very significantly by political action.

Conclusion
Hence, the case for descriptive representation of young people stands. As argued above, the strength of this case depends upon the extent to which each of the two criteria is fulfilled. In the case of young people, they are both fulfilled strongly: there are powerful concerns that are almost completely unique to young people, and which stand to be affected very significantly by political action.

Political parties and trade unions
The next question is whether, and if so to what extent, this democratic case for descriptive representation of the young holds weight in the context of membership of political parties and trade unions. So far, we have been considering the descriptive representation of young people in terms of membership of the representative assembly, so now we must adjust our case. To do so, we have to slightly adjust the second criterion and then see whether young people still fit it. (The first criterion does not need to be adjusted because it only makes reference to the group itself, and so the degree to which it is fulfilled only depends on the characteristics of this group.) Hence, the question of whether young people meet the second criterion becomes: do the significant, unique concerns of young people stand to be affected by the actions of political parties/trade unions?

Let us start with political parties. It has already been established that many of the significant, unique concerns of young people will be affected by the actions of the political assembly. What about the actions of political parties? To some extent, this dichotomy is a misnomer: the representative assembly will be comprised of members of the ruling political party(s) who has (have) been elected to the assembly, and it will implement an agenda that, to a greater or lesser extent, was decided by the party’s members.12 Thus, if the party is in power then its membership base will have determined who the country’s political representatives are (since being a member of a political party is a prerequisite for standing, and hence being elected, as a representative), and, to some degree, what policies government is implementing. Therefore, if a political party has been voted into power then membership of that party implies a very high level of influence. Even if the party is not in power, its members will influence it in its role as an opposition party. And since opposition parties also have a very significant political role – holding the government to account, offering alternative policy ideas, and so forth – membership will still enable significant influence. Therefore, political parties, both in and out of power, will be able to considerably affect the concerns of young people, and thus promote substantive equality and substantive interests. Both criteria are clearly met, and so the case for descriptive representation within political parties is strong.

What about trade unions? Trade unions are not concerned with people’s conditions in general, but only with their employment conditions. Many young people are in full-time education, and so would find trade unions to be of little relevance. Furthermore, many of the specific issues facing young people (such as student debt and housing, as explained above) are issues that which fall outside the scope of trade unions.

At any rate, to the extent that young people are in the workforce and have certain concerns that are relevant to trade unions, most of these concerns (e.g. wage level and employee safety) will not be unique to them, but will apply equally to workers of all ages – and yet trade unions would not be able to affect the concerns that are unique to young people. There will be some exceptions – zero-hours contracts might be one – but overall, the extent to which young people will have significant, unique concerns about employment conditions seems limited. Therefore, the degree to which the significant, unique concerns of young people can be affected by trade unions (i.e. the second criterion), and hence the case for descriptive representation of young people within trade unions, is weak. Descriptive representation of young people within trade unions would do little to further substantive equality or substantive interests. This conclusion is made all the more forceful now that trade unions have reduced in power.

The unequal distribution of power within both political parties and trade unions, tilted towards older generations, is only of democratic concern insofar as the second criterion is met, however. If it were not met at all, political parties/trade unions would not have any effect on the significant, unique concerns of young people, and so the inequality of power would be something of a red herring. It would be like there being few chess players on the local council, even though most people in the area play chess - this would be an inequality of power, but since the local council can’t have much impact on the problems of the chess world it would not be of democratic concern. But it is only political parties that seem likely to have much effect on the concerns of young people. The conclusion, then, is that it is only within political parties that the inequality of power would suggest a strong case for descriptive representation. Thus, young people, who clearly meet criterion one, meet criterion two strongly in the case of political parties, and weakly in the case of trade unions. Hence, there is a strong democratic case for descriptive representation of young people within political parties, and only weak case for their descriptive representation within trade unions. What, then, should be done?

It should be noted before we continue that I am asking this question in the spirit of political philosophy: I am asking what should be done, without worrying at this point whether or not it is done. Some trade unions will already be practising some of the suggestions I make below, and to that extent, according to my argument,
they are doing “what should be done” – in the case of other trade unions, which are doing no such thing, my argument would imply that they should start following these suggestions. I do not attempt an empirical union by union analysis.

Policy I: quotas

Though quotas are a popular tool of descriptive representation, they are not practical here. Quotas are inapplicable to the case of party or trade union membership simply because people freely choose to become members – they are not selected by the party/trade union in a way that could allow for a requirement that a certain proportion of members be from a particular group. However, because quotas are a popular method for achieving descriptive representation, it is helpful to see whether, if quotas could work, they would be democratically appropriate in the case of membership of political parties and trade unions. The answer to this question can function as a benchmark against which other possible policy responses can be assessed.¹³

To answer whether quotas would be democratically appropriate, we must ask another question: would the results of a quota in the given context further democracy, by improving substantive equality and promoting people’s substantive interests, to an extent that would outweigh the quota’s apparent harm to democracy? In other words, would a quota have a positive net impact on democracy in this context?

Enabling young people to gain a more equal level of political power will do more for substantive equality, and furthering their substantive interests, than the size of the harm to (formal) equality of prioritising one group over another in the selection of representatives.

In the case of trade unions, the answer is “no”: the impact of trade unions on the significant, unique concerns of young people would be minimal, in comparison to the definite and notable cost to democracy entailed by quotas. In the case of political parties, however, the question is much more difficult. As detailed above, political parties stand to have a considerable impact on young people’s concerns – but would this impact be considerable enough to outweigh the significant democratic costs that quotas would impose? I would suggest it would, because the positive effects that membership of political parties could have on the power structure, which is currently tilted against young people, will outweigh the temporary imbalance of institutionally designated decision-making power; i.e., enabling young people to gain a more equal level of political power will do more for substantive equality, and furthering their substantive interests, than the size of the harm to (formal) equality of prioritising one group over another in the selection of representatives.

Policy II: incentives and free membership

For the costs of descriptive representation to be outweighed in the case of trade unions, the policy to be pursued must therefore be one that produces less democratic harm than quotas. One such method could be to improve the incentives for young people to become members of political parties and trade unions. This would not directly harm the democratic process in the way that quotas would, because it would not impose a legal requirement that a particular group be represented in a certain fixed proportion. It could still be complained that such incentives would distort the democratic process. I accept this – the point is that it would not contravene it. The democratic costs of such a distortion would of course be proportional to the size of the distortion itself: they would be much greater if every young person was offered money for becoming a member than if her membership fee were merely less than the usual membership fee. Thus, an incentive system need cause only quite minor democracy-distorting effects; and these effects would entail costs that were sufficiently small to be outweighed by the democratic benefits of descriptive representation. An incentive system, moreover, would, unlike quotas, be perfectly applicable to the membership of political parties and trade unions.

One such method could be to improve the incentives for young people to become members of political parties and trade unions.

Let me conclude by offering some trade-union-policy suggestions that would meet this incentives criterion. One, as mentioned, would be for trade unions to charge a lower membership fee to young people (say, those aged between 18 and 30). A reduction of somewhere between 25 and 50% would seem reasonable: since membership fees are usually not very expensive anyway, even a 50% reduction would not amount to that much in real terms. Another suggestion would be for trade unions to offer certain benefits to young members that are not offered (or that are offered at a fee, or at least a higher fee) to other members. These could be benefits such as a free gym membership, but the democratic case for descriptive representation would be stronger if such benefits directly helped the democratic representation of the young. For example, the young could be offered free (or fee-reduced) places on public speaking or debating workshops, thus incentivising them not only to join the party/trade union but also to learn the very skills that will aid their representative abilities.

Finally, a method to boost the membership of young people that would incur even less democratic cost would be for trade unions to spend more money (though not an absurd amount more) on publicity and advertising that targeted young people than on publicity that targeted other respective groups. The democratic cost here would be especially low because the trade unions would not even be offering an incentive to join that other groups were not being offered; rather, this policy would largely just have the result that a higher percentage of young people were made aware of the possibility and benefits of joining a political party or trade union. Since they may well be less aware of these than are older generations, in whose youth the joining of a political party and/or trade union was more common and therefore more talked about, such a campaign may in fact serve only to correct the present inequality in knowledge between the young and older generations.

Publicity and advertising that targeted young people... would largely just have the result that a higher percentage of young people were made aware of the possibility and benefits of joining a political party or trade union.

Of course, these are just suggestions – and rough sketches of suggestions at that – and there are undoubtedly many more ways in which young people could be encouraged to join trade unions that would have only minimal democratic costs. These ideas could also potentially be combined: for example, young people could be
offered particular membership benefits that are then advertised in a campaign to which a higher-than-average level of funding is allocated (higher, that is, than the average level of funding spent on advertising to other, equivalent-sized, age cohorts).

What about raising the membership of young people in political parties, for which (if they were possible) I have argued that quotas would be democratically appropriate? Because membership of political parties is freely chosen, there could be no equivalent of quotas that mandated that a certain number of young people joined political parties. Instead, then, I would suggest two things. First, the above (incentives), but done to a considerably greater degree – i.e. stronger incentives. Second, a more radical policy proposal could be to randomly select a number of young people (from various demographics) every few years, and offer them free membership and various benefits for remaining within the political party and engaging with its decisions. The number of young people to whom these benefits would be offered could, accounting for the percentage who will decline the offer, then accord with a target number that resembled a quota. To reduce its democratic costs, the size of such a “quota” (as happens with quotas generally) should be based on a lower percentage than the percentage in which those young people make up the population, but, obviously, a significantly higher percentage than the one in which they currently make up the membership of political parties.

A dependent conception of democracy clearly shows that the under-representation of the young in political parties, and to a very limited extent in trade unions, poses a democratic problem. In conclusion, a dependent conception of democracy clearly shows that the under-representation of the young in political parties, and to a very limited extent in trade unions, poses a democratic problem. In the case of political parties, strong incentives and the bestowal of free membership, with benefits, upon a target number of young people in a way that resembles a quota, would be an effective way to remedy this democratic problem, by boosting descriptive representation. And in the case of trade unions, the under-representation of the young does not pose a democratic problem severe enough to justify the use of quotas (even if this were possible), but the use of incentives to boost trade union membership among young people would produce only minor democracy-distorting costs.

A sound case can therefore be made for raising the membership of young people in political parties, and (though to a weaker extent – meriting a correspondingly weaker medicine) trade unions, through descriptive representation, in order to further substantive equality and substantive interests – the requirements of democracy. In this final section, I hope I have brought this conclusion to life by giving practical examples of methods that would do just this.

Notes
1 E.g. for an analysis revealing this result in Germany, see Fitzenberger et al. (2009: 149). For Britain, see Blanden/Machin (2003: 392f.). For a study across many countries demonstrating particularly low union membership among the young (albeit alongside the additional claim that the oldest in society also have low membership) see Blanchflower (2007).
2 See also, for a similar distinction, Kolodny (2014: 197f.).
3 This is the final “justification” of democracy that Kolodny (2014: 199-202) gives: its ability to further people’s substantive interests.
4 For the classic treatment of this subject, see Pitkin (1967: ch. 4).
5 I assume here for simplicity that there is no such “competition” for group representation, and that the case for representing young people can therefore be evaluated on its own merits.
6 For a similar proposal, see Urbiniati (2006: 45). See also Urbiniati (2000).
7 For one of the few, see Burnheim (1985).
8 For the comment on lunatics, see Griffiths/Wollheim (1960: 190).
10 For a concise and simple overview of the main issues facing young people today, see Intergenerational Foundation (2017).
11 For an argument as to why low electoral turnout among the young is of significant democratic concern, and how to remedy it, see Tozer (2017: 18f.).
12 For example, a “democratic audit” found the Conservative Party’s policy agenda to be less responsive to its members than the Labour Party’s, which in turn was less responsive than the Liberal Democrats’ (Democratic Audit UK 2013). Generally speaking, a strong case can be made for quotas in the case of representation in the democratic assembly. For such a case applied to young people, see Bidadanure (2015).

References


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Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties (2018) provides a well-reasoned and in-depth case for the cartel party model, and yet fails to convincingly bring the theory up-to-date. Katz is currently chair of the Department of Political Science at John Hopkins University and Mair was a professor at the European University Institute in Florence until his death in 2011. Their thesis is this: in order to maintain their position in the face of declining political participation, parties take part in a kind of implicit collusion, in which they limit interparty competition, finance themselves using state resources, and focus increasingly on managerial competency rather than policy. The cartelization theory was originally proposed in the 1990s, but this volume constitutes the first book-length discussion of it, and as such it expands the authors’ thesis, addresses criticisms which have been directed at it and offers a coherent and well-structured argumentation for their claim that large political parties in advanced democracies have become cartelized. The authors are careful to base their model on empirical findings, and as such they include a significant amount of clearly-presented data and examples from within Europe and the USA.

This sets the volume squarely within the field of comparative politics. However, the cartel party model was first proposed three decades ago, and despite a final chapter which deals with the current rise of populism, the theory is perhaps on the cusp of becoming less pertinent to today’s political reality, as the proposed political cartels begin to disintegrate.

After a comprehensive introductory chapter, which provides a clear and relatively detailed overview, the core of the book begins by charting the evolution of political parties. From elite parties of the 19th century, through mass parties, catch-all parties and on to cartel parties, this development is explained as a response to significant social and historical changes. Cartel parties are not the end-point of a linear progression, but rather, just like other party types before them, an adaptation to social and political changes, and thus will also be superseded by a new type of party system. The cartel thesis was born from a data-gathering project in the 1990s, during which Katz and Mair noticed two major developments, which they argue have continued and indeed become more marked to this day (22). Firstly, parties have been moving increasingly closer to the state. An increase in legislative constraints and state financing draws the parties towards the government and therefore away from the citizens they are meant to represent. Secondly, the locus of power within parties has been shifting towards the party in government, and away from the party on the ground and the party as organisation. These three “faces” of the parties, as the authors term it, exist in an uneasy conflict, with varying degrees of autonomy and importance (54). With mediatisation and the increased need for funds and expertise that it brings with it, parties have become increasingly professionalised. The authors also note a corresponding increase in political careerism (76).

The central argument of the cartelization thesis is that political parties are becoming more similar – differences between them need to be minimised in order to produce the effects of cartel-like behaviour. This is driven in part by increased legislation, for example with regards to funding, campaigning and media appearances. All parties have to follow the same rules and thus begin to act in more similar ways. Katz and Mair state that parties were originally exogenous to the state and represented the demands of the electorate, but now they (collectively) have become a state-funded and -controlled institution (114). As is repeatedly pointed out, the regulation concerning their organisation and funding is passed by the government, which the parties themselves run. Politicians may not share a party, but they do share a profession and thus in order to pass beneficial legislation for their parties and themselves they need the support of other parties. This therefore encourages cartelization.

Katz and Mair suggest that a further cause of increasing similarity between parties is the passing of responsibility for various policy areas, including the economy, on to supranational or non-partisan organisations such as the EU, the World Bank, the WTO, the courts and private companies through privatisation. Issues which were once political become the sole responsibility of experts and technocrats, which leaves little space for ideology and policy (93). As is demonstrated by various data, the policies of mainstream parties have converged, with a much narrower choice on offer to voters (85). This shifts the focus of campaigns on to a comparison of managerial competence rather than political or ideological differences (82). The authors offer further evidence of this by showing that parties are much less selective with regards to their coalition partners, and will enter into coalitions which would have traditionally been unthinkable. The competition that remains between them is merely for show, and thus, worryingly, “democracy is hollowed out” (28). Ultimately, in a cartel system the effects of (inadvertent) collusion and cooperation significantly diminish the difference between win-
ning and losing an election and between being in and out of government (147). Thus the parties face lower risk, and need not be as responsive to voters. Interestingly, the authors go on to argue that the characteristics of a cartelized party system are not hugely dissimilar to the characteristics of the consensus democracy model, and yet the former is seen as a threat to democracy whilst the latter is seen as a valid, if imperfect, democratic form (148). Katz and Mair perceive the main similarities as being a delegation of responsibility by parties, a lack of power from voters, and a blurred distinction between parties which have won in elections and parties which have lost.

The final chapter offers a discussion of the result of cartelization, namely the rise of what the authors term the “anti-party-system party”. These populist parties (on both the left and the right) aim to break up the arrangement between the established parties (151). Populism sees the actions of cartel parties as being aggressively self-interested, whereas Katz and Mair describe them as being defensive, protective measures against threats to their privilege. Due to the dialectical nature of party evolution, Katz and Mair predicted in the 1990s – before populist parties were as significant a force as they are today – that cartel parties would give rise to their antithesis. The rise in populism cannot be explained by short-term triggers such as the 2008 financial crisis or increasing immigration, but must instead be seen as a piece within a long process of historical change. They argue that current governments cannot fulfill the inconsistent expectations of their electorate: they have to balance the electorate’s goals with the bureaucrats’ techniques, and resolve the conflict between liberal individualism and the notion of a united nation with a single interest. Thus voters turn to populist parties, which seem to offer a genuinely different alternative.

Katz and Mair conclude with the statement that it is unclear whether democracy is truly in danger, but that current events could logically lead to that conclusion. They very briefly propose a three-pronged solution: more responsibility to be taken on by politicians, a more inclusive political community, and more realistic expectations of government amongst the populace. They admit, however, that this is extremely unlikely to happen and instead advocate waiting for the next type of party system, which will arise as an as-yet-unknown synthesis of current political circumstances.

This volume is a substantial and clearly-argued expansion of Katz and Mair’s previous theory in the on-going debate about the state of democracy. As a whole, the book is moderate and considered in tone. Katz and Mair reject calling the current state of democracy a “crisis”, remarking that people have been worried about a crisis of democracy for the past 40 years. Party systems are seen within a sweeping historical arc, and the dialectical conception of party development gives assurance that things will change – although in what direction remains unclear. That being said, the authors do speak of democracy being hollowed out and facing peril, and their conclusion is certainly disheartening – in a cartelized system, self-interested, colluding parties become state-mouthpieces whilst abandoning their duties to the electorate. Their brief mention of some potential but highly improbable solutions does not offer the reader much hope.

Although the book as a whole is very clear and readable, the central terms “cartel”, “conspiracy” and “collusion” could be more consistently used. On occasion, it is unclear whether the authors intend to imply that the parties are part of a deliberate conspiracy, or whether they mean (as is usually, but not always, the case) that a cartelized party system simply produces the effects of collusion, without covert coordination. Furthermore, their discussion of the term “cartel” within economics muddies its meaning in their work even further. They describe, within economics, the blurring between oligopoly and cartel, and then argue that parties are similarly oligopolistic, but this fails to sufficiently clarify or justify their use of the term (132). Their choice of analogy between the cartelization of political parties and professional sports teams, however, is expedient. In sport leagues, a cartel develops to carefully manage competition on the field (analogous to elections) in order to ensure a particular division of revenue (government resources and positions) between the club owners (politicians).

In spite of the book’s clear and cogent form, doubts may arise as to the continued relevance of its content. Perhaps Katz and Mair have tried to apply their model too widely, and have stretched it beyond both its temporal and political limits. It is certainly not a given that empirical findings, the first of which were recorded in the 1960s, remain valid to this day, even if the authors have included more current data in this volume. To take an example, the data included to illustrate the convergence of parties’ manifestos only extends to 2005 (86-87). Excluding the most recent thirteen years of manifestos ignores an increasing polarization in politics, which, incidentally, has not only occurred in minority and alternative parties as Katz and Mair suggest, but has also taken hold within mainstream parties. The most obvious examples of this would be Trump within the Republican Party and, in the UK, Corbyn shifting the Labour Party to the left.

Furthermore, the authors are careful to highlight the utility and limitations of the cartel party system as a theoretical model, reiterating that no model completely matches reality, but it may have also been fruitful for them to refine the scope of its suitability. It would seem that it applies more readily to consensus/consociational rather than majoritarian democracies, to borrow Lijphart’s distinction made in “Patterns of Democracy”. The theory of cartelization is an overwhelmingly negative take on political parties. Thus, although the authors themselves do not draw this distinction, their theory is more disparaging and critical towards consensus democracies – whether or not this was the authors’ intention.

Intergenerational justice is clearly not the focus of this book, and the authors do not make much reference to young people. Indeed, when they do it is to say that many young party members join only to further their own political career and as such contribute to political careerism and by extension cartelization. This is overly cynical, and ignores the positive role young people can play in shaping politics. Furthermore, the question remains as to whether the cartelization model is truly still the most fitting model for the political sphere in which young people find themselves today. The rise of populism is not only confined to marginal parties, but is finding its way into the mainstream. Perhaps the new synthesis that the authors predicted is already taking shape, and bruising or indeed breaking the cartel in the process. As younger and new generations come of age, their political world will no longer be shaped by a cartel of parties as was the case in the 2000s, but instead by new forms of parties.

Undoubtedly, this book is a worthy contribution to the study of
comparative politics and provides a comprehensive discussion of the cartelization model – a theory of significant influence. There is certainly benefit to be found in the methodical and orderly way in which Katz and Mair take the reader through their theses, though more could have been done to bring the model up-to-date and assess future developments. The book is to be recommended as a robust discussion of social pressures on political parties, the ways in which they adapt to these and the state of democracy during the past few decades – if not right up to today.


Ian Gough: Heat, Greed and Human Need: Climate Change, Capitalism and Sustainable Wellbeing

Reviewed by Anna Braam

Ian Gough’s Heat, Greed and Human Need. Climate Change, Capitalism and Sustainable Wellbeing could not be more relevant or needed in this day and age. As the current Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels has recently shown, rapid and far-reaching transitions in all aspects of society are required to combat global warming and limit it to 1.5°C (IPCC 2018b: 1). In this book – published in 2017 – Ian Gough presents a pathway towards a three-stage transition that is needed for industrialised countries to keep global warming in line with the planetary boundaries. To showcase the current situation of climate change affecting nature and mankind and how to limit its consequences, Gough pursues an interdisciplinary approach – bringing together economic, ecological, political and social aspects of climate change. This is crucial, as the author concludes that “equity, redistribution and prioritizing human needs […] are critical climate policies” (13).

The book is 209 pages long (excluding an extensive bibliography and an index) and is presented in two parts. Part 1 first explains the concepts used for Gough’s analysis and the global issues faced on a larger scale, starting with the social dimensions of climate change (ch. 1) as well as human needs and sustainable wellbeing (ch. 2). Gough continues by highlighting climate capitalism and the relation between emissions, inequality and “green growth” (ch. 3). Part 1 ends with the interdependency of sustainable wellbeing, necessary emissions and fair burdens (ch 4). Gough argues that social development goals cannot be achieved without overstepping the available carbon space (Steckel et al. 2013).

Part 2 sets out the pathway towards eco-social policy in the rich world, starting with the question of how welfare states may transform into climate mitigation states (ch. 5) and further discussing those options. Gough identifies making production more eco-effi-

Heat – The threat of climate change
Climate change means the cooling and warming of the Earth over a long time period, caused by natural or human influences. The climate has been constantly changing for the last hundreds of thousands of years, e.g. through solar or volcanic activity, and changes in the Earth’s atmosphere and biosphere. But the global warming we are facing right now clearly is human-made, caused by a high concentration of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere, which accelerates the greenhouse effect. Before industrialisation in the 19th century, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was never above 280 parts per million (ppm). Latest measurements carried out by the Mauna Loa Observatory in October show a current CO₂ concentration level of 406 ppm, with CO₂ levels continuously rising over the last 150 years. The amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere clearly correlates with the steady warming of the Earth (Lane 2018: 1-4). From the beginning of industrialisation to today, the average global temperature has risen by 1°C, mainly caused by human activities such as burning fossil fuels, agriculture and land clearing.

Of nine critical Earth-system processes, each with their own safe
boundaries – climate change, the rate of biodiversity loss, the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, the stratospheric ozone, ocean acidity, global freshwater supplies, agricultural land availability, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution – the first three processes, including climate change, have already exceeded their safe boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009). Gough solely concentrates on the critical process of climate change and highlights its social dimension, following the consensus that ‘climate change is a threat multiplier’, posing the most immediate, serious and intractable threat to human wellbeing in today’s world” (19). To illustrate this relationship, Gough refers to Kate Raworth’s concept of a lifebelt or doughnut, which depicts the interaction between planetary boundaries and human wellbeing. The nine planetary boundaries make up the outer circle and the social foundations of human wellbeing form the inner boundary (Raworth 2012: 5, 12). Those foundations of human wellbeing such as food, health and education, draw on the Sustainable Development Goals formally accepted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015.

Among the threats to human wellbeing caused by climate change is the undermining of global food security. Temperate regions will face negative impacts on wheat, rice and maize production. Water resources will decrease and fisheries will be threatened by a redistribution of marine species and a reduction in biodiversity. Changes in temperatures and weather systems will also lead to health issues through heatwaves and fires. Because of changing disease vectors and crop patterns, food- and water-borne diseases will have more impact, especially in developing countries. In urban areas people and ecosystems are likely to suffer from the consequences of heat stress, flooding, air pollution, droughts and water scarcity. Rural areas will face these same problems, as well as changes in agricultural incomes and water access, while those communities with limited access to land and modern agriculture are expected to be most negatively affected (25).

**Human Need – Sustainable wellbeing as guiding principle**

In order to identify sustainable wellbeing, Ian Gough refers to universal human needs. For the author, the satisfaction of human needs – as opposed to wants – marks the only viable measure for negotiating trade-offs between climate change and human wellbeing. The most basic human needs include social participation, health and autonomy. Intermediate needs are water and nutrition, shelter and energy, a non-threatening environment and work practices, security in childhood, physical and economic security, education, healthcare and significant primary relationships. Those needs are found to be firstly *objective* and secondly *plural* as they cannot be added up or summarised in a single unit of account. A third theoretical feature of needs is the fact that they are *non-substitutable*, meaning that we cannot trade one need for another. Fourth, human needs are *satisfiable*. The amount of intermediate needs required to e.g. achieve a given level of health diminishes as their quantity grows. As climate change will progressively impose issues of intergenerational equity, it is of importance to understand needs as *cross-generational*. It is safe to say that there will be people in the future whose basic needs will be the same as ours. And the sixth theoretical feature of needs, in contrast to preferences, is their *sound ethical grounding*: needs come with associated claims of justice, they imply ethical obligations on individuals and social institutions (45-47). Therefore, human needs – regardless if present or future ones – trump present (and future) consumer preferences and wants.

**Greed – Capitalism and the threat of “business as usual”**

Rather than neoclassical economics, Gough uses political economy as a framework to showcase the interlinkages between economy, climate change and human needs and sees capitalism as the global system driving said relationship. In political economy, governments are seen as central institutions which reflect and shape the distribution of power and resources. Capitalism is portrayed as a system with certain key features, the first being the production of commodities for profit with limitless circulation. Second, capitalism is characterised by the private ownership of the means of production or capital. Furthermore, there is a class of people without property of their own who sell their labour-power for wages. Concerning the latter two features, a system of law recognising legal rights over many kinds of asset has developed as another fundamental element of capitalism.

As the capitalist system has spread over time and space and has steadily driven technological progress, endless economic growth has become a necessary corollary of capitalism. Herein lies the coevolution of capitalism and fossil hydrocarbons: the process of accumulation has been fed through fossil fuels since the late 18th century, first by burning coal and later additionally by oil and gas. Following Newell and Paterson, Gough states “the fundamental driver of global warming has been a combination of fossil-based industrialization and global capitalism – carboniferous capitalism” (8).

Global capitalism has led to global inequity: while industrialised countries of the global North, both historically and in the present, contribute disproportionately to global greenhouse gas emissions through fossil fuel use with only limited vulnerability to the effects of the resulting climate change, developing countries of the global South, mostly African and Island states, are most vulnerable to climate change but have contributed little to its genesis. As Althor et al. state, climate change inequity strongly correlates with economic output (2016: 1).

**The Three-Stage Transition: Green growth, recomposing consumption, post-growth**

Gough’s motivation to outline a three-stage transition process springs from the following circumstances: the global distribution of income is such that the richest 1% of the world have more than the bottom half of the world population, while the consumption-based emissions of these groups are nearly on the same level. On top of the already-existing inequality around the world, global growth in incomes has been highly inequitable for the last 30 years. If we want to eradicate poverty – the first of the Sustainable Development Goals – we cannot rely on the business-as-usual model. In line with Woodward and Simms (2006), Gough argues that “all strategies to eliminate global poverty are untenable unless the poor get a bigger slice of the whole cake – and the cake cannot continue to expand because of global constraints on emissions” (79). Gough concludes that either new forms of redistribution or a shift to an alternative economic pathway is required.

The first stage to an alternative, needs-based economy is “green growth”, which forms the centerpiece of the Paris Agreement (through national approaches, called the Nationally Determined Contributions, NDCs) and marks the only current politically viable strategy for a low-carbon economy. Green growth is a strate-
ing relying on long-term economic benefits flowing from emission mitigation and environmental protection in general (69f). There are two problems within the green growth strategy: first, even if all countries stayed in line with their NDC the overall emission cuts would still lead to a global warming of around 3.1°C compared to pre-industrial levels (Climate Action Tracker 2018). And secondly, the climate mitigation referred to in the Paris Climate Accord includes unproven technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS) and the usage of bioenergy – with uncertain social and environmental consequences. Green growth therefore can only be seen as a stepping stone towards a political economy based on needs, sufficiency and redistribution (2).

While green growth prioritises the eco-efficiency of production, it ignores the essential links between patterns of consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Challenging the ideas of prosperity and consumer sovereignty by advocating cuts in high-carbon luxury consumption is the key of the second stage proposed by Gough. Eco-social policies would include regulating advertising, taxing high-carbon luxuries, rationing carbon at the household level and nationalising certain high-carbon services. On the social level, a capitalist economy restructuring consumption will need to develop three characteristics. The first is reflexivity, meaning the ability of a structure, process or set of ideas to change itself in response to reflection on its performance. This would also allow for future generations to develop their own ideas and structures, not bound by the past. The second is a commitment to prevention, which would give governments the mandate to pursue preventive economic policies such as the substantial restructuring of financial markets and some nationalisation of investment (196-209). Lastly, the integration of local and national agency would allow not only for top-down processes but also for kinds of bottom-up agency – therefore empowering local campaigns and proactive action.

Gough believes that changing patterns consumption would take us a step further towards sustainable wellbeing, but it would still not limit global warming fast enough. The author therefore demands a more radical step: the third and last transition stage would be “post-growth”. The reduction of paid work time and thus absolute levels of incomes, consumption and emissions might be the most realistic policy to achieve a degree of negative growth or degrowth in the richest countries. Moving beyond growth to a steady-state economy goes against the main characteristic of capitalism, but it would erase the dilemma between the capitalist imperative to accumulate and the limits that nature sets. Eco-social policies in this transition stage would also include the expansion of collective ownership of wealth and capital, starting with energy supply – thus dismantling a further defining feature of capitalism: the private ownership of production.

Critical appraisal
Although post-growth is still considered a highly radical demand, Gough is not afraid to postulate a transition pathway beyond the capitalist system. With sustainable wellbeing as his guiding principle and an eco-social political economy perspective, Gough proposes a credible transformation process, especially for rich countries, which could actually lead to meeting the 1.5°C limit of global warming and a sustainable future for all.

Notes
1 The global North is defined as the rich world: capitalist states with OECD membership and the status of Annex I countries of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Gough 2017: 107).
2 A recent Oxfam study shows that in 2017 82% of worldwide generated wealth went to the richest 1%, while the poorest half saw no increase at all (Oxfam 2018: 2).

References


Call for Papers: IGJR issue 2/2019: Open topic issue on intergenerational justice

The Intergenerational Justice Review (www.igjr.org) is a peer-reviewed English language journal, reflecting the current state of research on intergenerational justice. The IGJR publishes articles from humanities, social sciences, and international law. The journal is released biannually and employs a double-blind peer review process. Its editorial board consists of about 50 internationally renowned experts from ten different countries. IGJR is indexed under Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ).

Topic
We welcome submissions for an open topic issue on intergenerational justice. While some issues focus on a specific topic that is decided upon by the editors, issue 2/2019 does not have such a thematic limitation.

Submission Requirements
Articles may be submitted electronically through the IGJR homepage (see “Submissions”). Submissions will be accepted until 15 July 2019.

Articles should be no more than 30,000 characters in length (including spaces but excluding bibliography, figures, photographs and tables). For details, see the author guidelines: http://www.igjr.org/ojs/igjr_doc/Author_Guidelines.pdf

Call for Papers: IGJR issue 1/2020
Housing crisis: How can we improve the situation for young people?

The Intergenerational Justice Review (www.igjr.org) is a peer-reviewed English language journal, reflecting the current state of research on intergenerational justice. The IGJR publishes articles from humanities, social sciences, and international law. The journal is released biannually and employs a double-blind peer review process. Its editorial board consists of about 50 internationally renowned experts from ten different countries. IGJR is indexed under Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ).

The topic of issue 1/2020 (which is planned to be the first part of a double issue) will be

“Housing crisis: How can we improve the situation for young people?”

We welcome submissions to the issue 1/2020 that analyse the housing situation of the young generation.

Topic outline
In many European countries, and especially in large cities and university towns, affordable housing is a pressing and sometimes explosive issue.

In the debate about such questions as home ownership or rent increase caps (Mietpreisbremse – German: rent brakes), the intergenerational perspective is often forgotten. But different generations are affected in noticeably different ways. Rising rent and purchase prices and the failure of housing construction programmes make it ever more difficult for young people to access the housing market. The quality of housing is a key factor in living standards and wellbeing, as well as an integral element of social integration, yet in 2014 a total of 7.8% of young people in the European Union (aged between 15 and 29) were in severe housing need, 25.7% of the young people in the EU lived in overcrowded households, and 13.6% lived in households that spent 40% or more of their equivalised disposable income on housing (Eurostat 2016).

In response to the 2008/9 financial crisis, government programmes for public and social housing aimed at the poorer parts of the population were cut back, leading to diminishing access to affordable housing, especially in urbanised areas. For young people, this means that they have to pay higher rents. Today, therefore, they often live longer in their parental homes, or in the private rental sector, than previous generations (Ronald/Lennartz 2018).

What is often referred to as a “housing crisis” can certainly be seen as a question of intergenerational justice, because the baby
boomers had easier access to housing or to the means to finance it. Today, the baby boomer generation benefits from housing inequality in two ways: through property values and rental income. At the same time, with pension systems under pressure because of ageing populations, the ownership of residential property has become an important component of old-age provision (Helbrecht/Geisenkauzer 2012).

Younger generations, on the other hand, are disadvantaged in two respects: today’s increased demand leads to further pressure on the housing market in the low-price segment, which in turn leads to an increase in the rent burden for lower and middle income groups, and also makes the purchase of residential property more difficult. In many parts of Europe, such as the Southeast of the UK, in the 1980s the average cost of a first home was three to four times the annual average salary; today it can be ten or twelve times the annual average salary.

From this perspective, it can certainly be argued that the housing market situation is not intergenerationally fair. And in many European countries, ownership of real estate has become a much greater source of wealth inequality between generations than salary differentials.

This gloomy picture of housing and home ownership is, however, by no means universal. Statistics point to significant differences between countries, and international comparisons show that successful housing policies are possible. An EU comparison shows that the percentage of households managed by a person aged 18–29 who spends 40% or more of their disposable income on housing costs ranges from 1.3% (in Malta) to 45.4% (in Greece) (Leach et al. 2016). It is clear that some countries perform significantly better than others in providing affordable housing for the next generation.

Articles could approach the topic through a broad range of questions, including:

- How did the housing crisis come to be and how can housing inequality for young people be improved?
- Why are some countries better than others at providing affordable housing for the next generation? What are the similarities and differences? What lessons can be drawn from cross-country comparisons?
- What political levers, such as subsidies, could be introduced to help the younger generation achieve more affordable and long-term housing security? Is the German Mietpreisbremse a successful instrument for this and how does it affect the young generation?
- Planet vs. people: It is often suggested that the solution to the housing crisis is to build more homes, but this raises the question of encroaching on green spaces and the environmental impact that this implies. How can that tension be resolved? How can urbanisation and the housing market become more environmentally friendly?
- Another solution is to use existing housing stock more efficiently. Can government policy help to bring this about, for example by incentivising the fuller occupation of large houses with unused spare bedrooms, or by discouraging the ownership of second homes through higher taxation? What is the potential of new forms of housing, such as shared housing, multi-generational housing, homeshare (housing for help)?
- How does homelessness affect young people in particular and how can it be combated?
- How can those who work in the media be encouraged to address this topic?

Submission Requirements
Submissions will be accepted until 31 December 2019. Articles may be submitted electronically through the IGJR homepage (see “Submissions”). Articles should be no more than 30,000 characters in length (including spaces but excluding bibliography, figures, photographs and tables). For details, see the author guidelines: http://www.igjr.org/ojs/igjr_doc/Author_Guidelines.pdf

Demography Prize: Note that this topic is closely related to the subject of the next Demography Prize promoted by the Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations (FRFG) and the Intergenerational Foundation (IF). The prize is endowed with 10,000€ and has 31 December 2019 as its deadline. Young researchers may also wish to participate in this essay competition, and it is hoped that this edition of the IGJR will contain a selection of the best prize submissions in English. More information will become available shortly on www.intergenerationaljustice.org and www.if.org.uk.

References


Recommended literature


