Combining Intergenerational and International Justice

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Abstract: The exigencies of intergenerational and of international justice seem to conflict. This paper discusses this problem and develops a solution to it. After criticizing several alternative justifications from the literature, a fully universalistic (i.e. universalistic in the temporal as well as spatial dimension) prioritarian welfare-ethic is developed and justified on the basis of our sympathy: first a criterion of moral value is proposed, followed by a conception of moral duties, which relies on socially binding norms and requires to strive for moral efficiency (most moral value for a given effort). Finally, these ideas are applied to determining priorities between several big social agendas. It turns out that, in practice, dimensional conflicts are less prevalent than initially thought.

Tasks and duties of intergenerational justice seem to conflict with those of international justice. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions in order to maintain a stable climate system seems to require a restriction on economic growth in emerging, and, to a lesser extent, even in developing countries; reducing public debt for the sake of not financially burdening the next generation seems to require cuts in social spending and investment programmes for reducing unemployment etc. Not surprisingly, such conflicts arise in politics because of scarce financial resources. Surprisingly, however, conflicts between the temporal and spatial justice dimensions in which the set of beneficiaries can be delimited: 1. the spatial dimension: whether people of only our country or of all nations count as objects of moral concern; 2. the temporal dimension: whether people belonging to the currently dominant generation, all currently living persons, or beings of all generations morally count; and 3. the ontological dimension: which kind of beings are moral beneficiaries: humans, sentient beings, animals or living beings etc.? This paper deals with the spatial and the temporal dimension only. Once being included in the set of beneficiaries, beings may be considered an object of moral concern to a full or partial degree; in particular, people living in distant countries or in the distant future may be included among the beneficiaries but given less weight. In this paper, only morals that give equal weight to all its beneficiaries will be considered. Universalism in both the temporal and the spatial dimension will be henceforth called “full universalism”.

There are ethics which are universal in one dimension only, such as John Rawls’ theory of justice, which is beneficiary universalistic in the temporal dimension but nationalistic in the spatial dimension. Although several theorists find this incoherent, in the strict sense it is not. Therefore justifying full beneficiary universalism requires justifying universalism in both dimensions. The most ambitious attempt in this direction is probably Thomas Nagel’s (1970) argument, which has been adopted by other philosophers such as Parfit and Broome. The basic idea of his justification is this: persons ontologically consist of person-time slices: me now, me in ten years, you tomorrow, my son in twenty years, the not yet born eldest grandchild of Julio Alexander (from Guatemala) in 80 years etc. Now it is a universally accepted request of rationality to care for one’s later selves, and to give them all the same weight too. However, according to the ontological premise, I will be as separated from myself in ten years as you tomorrow are separated from yourself today and from me today, so the rationality requirement extends to all person – time slices. Thus the rational request of caring for person – time slices different from me today extends to all person – time slices, and, in turn, becomes a way of reaching full beneficiary universalism.

This nice and seemingly strong justification of full beneficiary universalism, however, contains several fallacies. Although it is theoretically unproblematic to consider a person to be composed of time slices, from a biological as well as from a psychological and, in particular, from a motivational perspective, there is a natural continuity between succeeding time slices of the same person, whereas between different persons a clear discontinuity exists. For example, if one of my fingers is cut off today, I will be missing my finger in all my future time-slices. Moreover, my hedonic desires not to suffer but to be happy are timeless (I wish...
this today, tomorrow and whenever) and refer to me (or to any of my future selves). Only because of these desires does the rational requirement to consider our further future as well as our present selves have a motivational basis that makes it acceptable and achievable; and because we often overlook how our desires in the (sometimes distant) future will be affected by some action in the present, to keep the rational requirement in mind makes pragmatic sense.

The necessary motivating justification of morals cannot rely on a priori reasons; it must instead rest on real rational motives or desires. The inverse route of justification – i.e. there is an a priori intelligible requirement to care about all person – time slices different from me now, which then, in a way which is not clear, generates the rational desire to do exactly this – is neither based on a justified principle, since there simply is no valid a priori justification for this rationality requirement, and without such a justification its content appears to be arbitrary and ad hoc, nor can this route generate the desire and motivation out of nothing.

A lesson to be learned from the failure of Nagel’s master argument for full beneficiary universalism is that the necessary motivating justification of morals cannot rely on a priori reasons; it must instead rest on real rational motives or desires. Peter Singer’s ethics is currently the most prominent defence of full beneficiary universalism, and it is based on rational motives. Singer develops a two-piece strategy of justification, in which the first part justifies a fully universal utilitarian criterion of morality, and the second part provides reasons why to follow it. Secondly, the systematically primary justification of the moral criteria has to rely on already motivating reasons to adopt exactly these criteria as one’s personal morals.

II. Justifying a fully universalistic prioritarianism
In criteriological or normative ethics, the currently most prominent and in each case possibly fully universalistic ethic is the group of welfare ethics. These are ethics which define the moral value of an action exclusively in terms of welfare, utility or desirability brought about by this action for the persons or sentient beings affected by it. The various individual or personal desirabilities are aggregated in some way to one measure of moral value of this action. The different types of welfare ethics differ mainly in how this aggregation is undertaken. Utilitarianism simply adds up the individual utilities. Moderate welfare egalitarianism first calculates this sum too but then subtracts from it a measure of unequal utility distribution; the higher the inequality, the greater the subtraction. Prioritarianism gives desirability changes for people who are generally worse off a greater weight; the worse off people are, the greater the weighting.

Due to the fact that in welfare-ethical criteria of moral value the wellbeing or utility of beings is the only relevant independent variable, irrespective of spatial or temporal distance, these ethics are in principle fully universalistic. In addition, they are clear and able to include in their considerations everything which is of value and to balance it against all the other aspects. Therefore, welfare ethics are optimally apt for operationalising full universalism, and, as such, the remainder of this essay will proceed on the basis that they constitute the right general approach.

However, it is always possible to limit the fully universalistic approach of welfare ethics by adding boundary principles or discounting factors. In addition, as just explained, there is a plurality of welfare ethics which imply different preferences with regard to various important questions. So, even if we accept a general welfareist approach in normative ethics, we still have to decide which particular approach to adopt, whether perhaps to limit its universalism and why to accept this particular approach in the first place. Such a decision can only be rationally arrived at with the help of an approach to justifying ethics.

The discussion in the first section, in which various attempts to justify universalistic morals were described, has taught us several lessons. R(requirement):1: motivating justification: The prospectively justified may neither be intuitionistic (since this is not a justification at all; intuitions are unreliable etc.) nor a priori (because mere a priori considerations cannot provide motivating reasons to adopt and follow moral criteria); it should instead consist of listing motivating reasons to adopt and follow these morals. This implies that the content of such motivating reasons will also shape morals’ content. R2: motivational amplifiers: The justification should be twofold. Firstly, the moral criterion has to be justified by motivating reasons in such a way that wise moral subjects adopt it and therefore are inclined, to some degree, to follow it. Secondly, further motivating reasons should then be provided and institutions designed which strengthen the motivation to follow the morals (justified in the first step) to a degree that one actually does so in practice. The first step provides the moral “signal” so to speak, the second step “amplifies” it.

However, these specifications are not yet sufficient and selective enough to get the justification of morals started. The considerations undertaken so far (R1 and R2) relate only to formal aspects. Considerations regarding the specific idea, value, aim and function of morals are missing and have to be discussed and fixed. Unfortunately, the
ethical discussion regarding this part of morals is underdeveloped; therefore, the following considerations are much more speculative than what has been developed so far. So what, according to this speculation, is the idea, the aim, and function of morals?

“For defining ‘moral value’, we have to look for those parts of the moral subjects’ prudential desirability functions which are subject universal... there are only very few components of our individual desirability functions which fulfil this condition; the most important is a certain expected sympathy.”

In order to provide an answer to this question, two functionally rather distinct morals have to be distinguished: there are individual, private morals, which can be followed by their respective subject individually, and there are social morals, which are institutionalised, in particular by social norms. Social morals are binding for everyone and enforced by threats of social sanctions. The aim of individual morals may be to realise one’s sympathetic and respect inclinations (i.e. natural altruistic inclinations with a content near to morals) in a systematic and organised way. The function of socially binding morals, on the other hand, could be a kind of prudential consensusalism: R3: The aim of socially binding morals is, first, to provide an interpersonally uniform and binding value order for a society, i.e. a complete social desirability function, namely the moral desirability function, which, second, is the basis for deciding about conflicts of interests in a binding and socially accepted form, hence has a peace-making function, and which, third, is the basis for determining projects of social cooperation, to be realised collectively. According to the motivation requirement (R1), the moral desirability function must be motivational and, according to prudential consensusalism (R3), it must also be consensual, i.e. equal for all subjects of the moral system; this can be called “subject universalism”. (Subject universalism says that all the subjects of a moral system have the same moral value function; beneficiary universalism says that the realm of objects who benefit from the moral system is universal.) A motivating form of subject universalism is attainable only if the moral desirability function is (more or less) identical to or follows from the subject universal parts of the moral subjects’ prudential (i.e. rational plus stable) individual desirability functions. In other words, to identify the moral value function, we have to look for those parts of the moral subjects’ prudential desirability functions which are subject universal, i.e. (more or less) identical in all moral subjects. There are only very few components of our individual desirability functions which fulfil this condition; the most important is a certain expected sympathy, i.e. the expected desirability of having, as a consequence of some measure to be evaluated, sympathetic feelings for beings one is not personally acquainted with; the respective desire or motive to produce more desirable sympathetic feelings may be called “sympathy optimising”. For example, for Amy and Bud, Carl eating a nutritious meal may in one respect have the same expected prudential desirability, namely in the respect that this perhaps will make Amy and Bud have the same amount of sympathetic feelings for Carl, i.e. enjoying Carl’s moment of well-being. For open-minded subjects (prudence requires open-mindedness), the sympathetic feelings for beings one is not personally acquainted with are not restricted to certain groups of persons, like the citizens of one’s community or state; hence, sympathy tends to be beneficiary universal. If our sympathetic feelings were proportional to the beneficiary’s well-being, the desirability function of expected sympathy would be utilitarian – and this may be what moral sentimentalists defending or tending towards utilitarianism (like David Hume or Adam Smith) had in mind. However, our sympathetic feelings are not proportional to the beneficiary’s well-being: negative sympathy, pity, is stronger than positive sympathy, i.e. joy about the other’s pleasure and good condition. As a consequence, the desirability function of expected sympathy is not proportional to the beneficiary’s well-being but convex: further increases in well-being (over life-time) lead to, taken together, more desirable sympathetic feelings, but the increment becomes smaller and smaller. And this means that the moral desirability function resulting from its equation with the desirability function of expected sympathy is prioritarian, giving the more weight to improvements the worse off the beneficiaries are.9

So subject universalism does not analytically imply beneficiary universalism; but the empirically individuated subject universal desirability function of sympathy optimising tends to be beneficiary universal too. Why should we not curb this tendency within certain limits? To be more precise, the question is not whether many or the vast majority of our socially binding or of our personal moral projects should not serve the persons next to us (probably in fact they should do so), or why we should devote equal care to all persons (this would be absurd); the question instead is whether the range of beneficiaries should be limited in principle, i.e. before deciding on single projects. The main reason for not limiting the range of beneficiaries is again the universalistic characteristic of the source of these morals: if we are confronted with the misery of a being beyond the artificially introduced limits, e.g. of national borders, and hence beyond our active concern, sympathy will emerge nonetheless (if it is not blocked by defence mechanisms), thereby rendering our active but curbed sympathy optimising void.

However, we may nonetheless be tempted to curb the range of beneficiaries (e.g. to save costs), accepting the resulting sympathy costs associated with the relatively rare interactions with the sentient beings beyond our official beneficence. There are further reasons why morals should not be limited in this way. In the spatial dimension one finds the nationalist limits on socially binding morals undermining the peacemaking function of morals at the international level; and instead of increasing forces by global cooperation, they lead to the coexistence of various, taken together, often incompatible and hence mutually obstructive projects of different national communities. For example, country A’s project is economic growth, for which it needs the estates of country B as well as its raw materials and markets; country B’s project is economic development, for which it is best to prohibit the ceding of its estates and to strictly regulate the export of its raw materials as well as the import of mass and luxury products; the result will probably be a trade war between country A and B. Worse outcomes are also possible.

In the temporal dimension, a direct war...
between generations who are not living at least to some extent simultaneously is impossible. However, a sort of revolving strife between, on the one hand, the presently dominant middle generation and, on the other, the young and the old generation is clearly possible and, perhaps to some degree, a reality. To strictly confine the range of beneficiaries, however, is more difficult in the temporal dimension than in the spatial dimension because of the permanent change of each possible in-group and out-group, the permanent change of possible coalition partners, and because of the strategically disadvantageous position any such strictly confined group of moral subjects and beneficiaries will end up in – though several gerontocracies show that rather strict temporal confinement, the strategic disadvantage notwithstanding, is possible in cases where the successor generation is confident to inherit all the privileges of the currently dominant generation. In any case, the listed difficulties make moral systems with strictly confined temporal limitations on the sets of beneficiaries unstable. Most of the accomplishments of present generations which are valuable for future generations have not primarily been intended to be so; they pay off already for the present generation and are valuable for future generations only via inheriting goods which are left over but still useful. Nonetheless, in the temporal dimension too, far extending cooperation is possible, namely intergenerational cooperation on long-term projects, with the first cooperating generation reaping only minor profits from the project, whilst later generations are needed to complete it, and the whole project’s value exceeds the value of comparable one-generation projects – consider the cultivation of land, the planting of woods, and other very long-term infrastructural projects (tunnel construction, new traffic routes etc.) or, in former times, the building of cathedrals. This presupposes a temporarily rather far extended subject universality of the underlying social value function. Though it may seem at first that present generations can, for their own profit, easily and without risk harm future generations (via environmental degradation or resource depletion), and that, from the temporally extended cooperation just described, these present generations can only encounter disadvantages or, at least, too little in the way of profit, at second glance we may recognise that it is also possible that future generations cancel out the prior generations’ projects and hopes – in particular if the projects were intended to serve the prior generation’s memory (grateful or admiring memory itself, physical portraits or biographies, mausoleums, idiosyncratic architecture or landscape or social design) or if they were planned perhaps even for future “beneficiaries” but without sufficient subject universality (like much of Stalinist or fascist architecture, megalomaniac nature destruction and “idiosyncratic” social structures like stone age communism or the Millennium Reich). For guaranteeing fruitful intergenerational cooperation via socially binding morals, a temporally universal moral desirability function is needed.

All this shows that the temporal subject and beneficiary universality of socially binding morals are normally better for realising the function of such morals than temporally confined morals. Somewhat different arguments hold in favour of full universality of individual morals. Confining the reach of individual morals is also possible; and it is probably viable to make life meaningful via self-transcendent projects whose significance is narrowly confined to one’s spatial and temporal neighbourhood and which are not embedded in universal projects. Why one’s personal moral desirability function should be fully universal is mainly a question of personal identity: if one does not want to be provincial (i.e. the significance of one’s projects and life to be restricted to one’s neighbourhood, the object of one’s pride and identification to have only vanishing meaning in a universal context, and the “validity” of one’s values restricted to a community of few persons), then full beneficiary universality is the best remedy. The same line of reasoning holds indirectly for socially binding morals too: as requirement R2 states, to be effective, these morals depend on amplifying motives such as self-transcendence, feelings of self-worth etc.; if the range of beneficiaries of socially binding morals is too narrow, such morals are not apt to be adopted as personal morals by subjects with more cosmopolitan ideals; as a consequence, these subjects will not adopt and sustain these morals; and if there is a significant share of cosmopolitan subjects, limited moral conceptions will fail as socially binding morals.

We have so far considered only the moral desirability function, i.e. the evaluative part of morals. Now we have to deal with the normative or instructive part: what shall we do? In axiological ethics (i.e. ethics whose primary moral notion is the concept of moral value, like welfare ethics), moral actions serve to realise moral values. However, we are not moral machines which are programmed to always do the morally best; this is simply impossible; and apart from acting morally, we want to have elbow room for our private projects. Therefore, our moral commitment, i.e. the time and resources we dedicate to morals, is limited in principle – the right amount of moral commitment is not of interest in the present context. But if the sense of our moral actions is, nonetheless, the realisation of moral values, then this aim is served better if more moral value is realised, which under the condition of limited resources leads to the request of personal moral efficiency: R4.1: the resources the subject is prepared to dedicate to morals should be invested efficiently, i.e. where they produce maximal moral value. This holds for personal morals, but analogously it holds for socially binding morals too. Socially binding morals do not confide (entirely) in the subjects’ autonomous motivation for moral action, but introduce norms supported by the threat of social sanctions to strengthen the motivation to act morally; so these norms are again instruments for realising moral values. However, such socially binding norms – whether formal, i.e. legal, or informal norms – do not fall from the sky; they have to be put through by subjects with a particularly high moral motivation, often via a long political process and in the face of resistance, and afterwards they have to be maintained, at least in part, by subjects with a special moral motivation. Hence, there are strong limits to the possibility of emergence of new socially valid moral norms – limits produced by political resistance as well as the scarcity of moral motivation among the subjects engaged in sustaining such norms.”

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to realise moral values, this aim is served better if more value is realised, which under the condition of limited resources leads again to a requirement of social moral efficiency: R4.2: If new moral norms shall be implemented or old norms reformulated, those norms which are politically and technically feasible, and which altogether (i.e. including also surveillance, punishments etc.) produce the highest moral value, shall be realised. Efficiency requirements will often lead to giving priority to those projects that help people who are close (in any respect: physically, mentally, socially, etc.) to us, however, not necessarily and certainly not always. Let us study this in more detail.

III. Efficient moral politics – international and intergenerational

With full universality of morals, for political subjects like states or alliances of states a huge variety of possible long- and short-term interventions or projects to institutionalise new norms or to reform old ones for moral improvement, i.e. welfare increase, become imaginable. Since not all projects can be realised, they compete with each other. In particular, conflicts between present-day national, international and intergenerational concerns (i.e. who will be the primary beneficiaries) are possible and should be expected. According to the theory developed earlier, the presupposition for taking an option into consideration is whether it is technically feasible and politically enforceable; and the criterion for deciding between the remaining options is their moral efficiency: more efficient projects shall be realised first. “Moral efficiency”, more precisely, is usually conceived as the cost-welfare ratio, i.e. the resources invested for realising a given project divided by the moral value produced by it; the lower this ratio is (i.e. if the project is relatively cheap), the higher is the project’s efficiency.11 The usual units for measuring resources of all kinds in a comparable and uniform way are monetary units, e.g. US-dollars (= USD). The units of moral value are morally and quality adjusted life years, or “(m)QALYs” for short: for calculating the moral value of the life of a certain person, first, the mean well-being of this person has to be established (via many interviews or via inferences from empirical results about the usual well-being of persons in the same situation) and expressed in per cent of the social mean well-being (so 50% or 0.5 means that the respective person is only half as happy as the rest of the population); second, this personal mean is multiplied with the person’s (expected) lifespan; the result is the personal value of this person’s life, measured in QALYs – which is a measure of the personal utility. Third, depending on the moral criterion used, the personal utility has to be translated into a moral value via a moral value function; in the case of prioritarianism, this is done via a concavely increasing (i.e. less and less increasing) weighting function; the result is the moral value of the person’s life, measured in prioritarian QALYs (= pQALYs). Finally, for determining the moral value of a certain action, the moral value of the affected person’s life with that action is subtracted from the value it has without that action. In the following, utilitarian cost-welfare ratios, where the welfare is measured in terms of quality adjusted life years (USD/QALY), as well as prioritarian cost-welfare ratios, where welfare is measured in priority weighted quality adjusted life years (USD/pQALY), will be provided. The values of USD/QALY and of USD/pQALY are not directly comparable; only values of the same measure can be compared, and then express (inverse) relative preferability.

The following assessments are based on some rough estimates I have developed in other publications; they are not very exact, but give an idea of the order of magnitude. Mere present-day national actions, like reduction of public debts or income redistribution (e.g. for social assistance or provision of basic health, programmes against unemployment, in particular youth unemployment, programmes for better education, programmes for igniting economic growth etc.), although, of course, immensely important, will not be discussed here because the respective efficiency orders even among OECD countries vary greatly due to differing circumstances. The following list of international and intergenerational projects is ordered roughly according to their moral efficiency, more efficient projects are presented first.

1. Allowances against starvation, in particular in cases of endemic famines, restore the hungry person’s original life expectancy with the help of a relatively minor contribution over a limited period; hence within a population, such measures donate to its members, on average, half the life expectancy at birth of that population, e.g. 30-35 years. According to a very rough estimate, the efficiency during the supply period alone is about 784 USD\textsubscript{pQALY} per QALY, or 395 USD\textsubscript{pQALY}/QALY.12 This figure is still radically reduced if, after some relatively short allowance period, a return to normal life is possible (e.g. if the alimentation phase lasts one year in a region with a life expectancy of 60 years, then the just indicated amount would have to be divided by 30, thus reaching 26 USD\textsubscript{pQALY}/QALY and 13 USD\textsubscript{pQALY}/pQALY). If measures of this sort are necessary and possible, they should be given top priority.

2. Creating a well-ordered state is to erect a sovereign political and administrative public power with an effective and law-abiding state machinery devoted to the citizens’ welfare and which respects human rights and the law of peoples and, at best, is liberal and democratic too.13 Much of world poverty and social disintegration is not simply a consequence of so far insufficient economic and social development, but of missing or, even worse, counteracting executive or other power structures led by self-enriching regimes or political castes, which for ensuring their power tend to suppress political opposition or social minorities. The overturning of such regimes and the creation a well-ordered state – via measures ranging from insightful reforms by enlightened leaders over peaceful or violent revolutions by a competent opposition, to humanitarian interventions – may liberate political, social and economic potentials, which lead to fast development. Foreigners can support such processes in various ways, beginning with materially helping and instructing the opposition, providing retreat possibilities etc. The last resort can be humanitarian intervention, which does not only protect the victims of crimes against humanity, but, at best (especially if strong and competent opposition forces are present), also overturns an inhuman regime and initiates the progression towards a well-ordered state. Although humanitarian interventions, like wars in general, are tremendously expensive, it is possible, under such conditions, that they are morally quite efficient due to their long-term political, social and economic benefits. (The Kosovo intervention, which did not only protect and liberate the Kosovars,
but also led to the fall of the racist M"{o}nsieur, an example in kind.
According to a rough calculation, the moral efficiency of the immediate humanitarian effects of this intervention – mostly by preventing genocide – was 9426 USD/pQALY or 9775 USD/1000/pQALY.\(^1\) Adding the moral value of the further political and economic benefits (which are very hard to estimate), i.e. the so-called peace dividend, these values are further reduced considerably. To avoid misunderstanding, it has to be added that neither the Afghanistan nor the second Iraq war were humanitarian interventions; their moral values are debatable; and, if they have a positive moral value, their cost-welfare ratio will be tremendously higher than the ratio calculated for Kosovo.

3. Development aid, at least when it is well planned, goes beyond feeding the poor, i.e. providing some sort of permanent social assistance for increasing the income of the poor somewhat above the absolute poverty line – which, again according to a very rough estimate, may cost 6106 USD/2010/QALY or 4384 USD/2010/pQALY.\(^1\) Such social assistance is only a fallback position for development aid. Good development aid accomplishes a certain level of economic and agricultural development, mass and elite education, decent health and life expectancy etc. together with the respective infrastructures in such a way that the country developed so far can guarantee a minimum level of prosperity to all its citizens and is no longer dependent on foreign help. There are excellent development aid projects which are highly efficient, impressively more efficient than the values for social assistance just given – e.g. medical assistance for visually impaired or handicapped people, which in extreme cases makes a blind person see for 40 USD, thus reaching an efficiency of up to less than 2 USD/2010/QALY, or projects of housing and educating street children, or vaccination or AIDS prevention projects. However, these seem to be the cherries on the cake, whereas the mass of developmental aid is much more awkward, much less efficient, and, in parts, even detrimental, often as a consequence of the problems touched upon under point 2, or because exploitation is camouflaged as development aid or help is given without feedback.\(^1\) Looking for efficiency whilst keeping in mind the respective traps, the efficiency of development aid should not lag far behind that of creating a well-ordered state.

4. Fighting climate change and its consequences is another big topic on the international agenda. Anthropogenic climate change has very few positive consequences (like extending cultivable land towards the poles in some regions of the world) but a huge variety of massive negative impacts – like extending malaria, increasing and aggravating hot spells and hurricanes, the submerging of low islands by the sea, etc. The worst effects, however, will probably result from the aridisation and desertification of former cultivable land, which lead to the displacement, migration and often pauperisation of the affected population, to more famines, increases in the price of food and hence an enormous growth of the number of the absolute poor. With “business as usual” these effects may lead to an additional 4 million casualties per year in the second half of this century.\(^1\) The most important countermeasure, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, requires radical technical improvements at considerable costs, which, however, will, in any case, be inevitable one day. A rough estimate says that sustainable reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to the 1990 level (with discounting future costs by 3% per year) may cost 10268 USD/2010/QALY or 9380 USD/2010/pQALY.\(^1\) The vast majority of victims of business as usual will live in poor countries; and its worst effects will be brought about by aggravating the situation of the poor. Conversely, this means that development aid also mitigates several bad effects of climate change and makes this aid still more efficient.

In order to give an idea of the efficiency of the programmes just discussed, these have to be compared with measures undertaken in rich countries. Some examples are: social assistance in the U.S., i.e. raising income of people slightly below the poverty line, has a cost-welfare relation of 53939 USD/2010/QALY or 51710 USD/2010/pQALY;\(^1\) reducing taxes of the very rich (more than 1 million USD annual income) or increasing top investment bankers’ bonuses has a cost-welfare ratio of at least 10 million USD/2010/(p)QALY; mostly, however, this ratio (more precisely: the limit of this ratio as the starting income approaches 75000 USD/2010/ year) is infinite (i.e. the beneficiary’s well-being does not increase at all)\(^7\) and sometimes negative (i.e. the beneficiary’s well-being decreases via the usual disasters of greed).

The comparatively much higher efficiency of the international and intergenerational projects discussed above (as compared to national present-day projects) is to a great extent due to the fact that the beneficiaries of these measures are, at least to a large extent, poor people in poor countries. This has three efficiency increasing effects: 1. because of the lower income, the marginal utility of income increases; 2. purchasing power of money from rich countries in these countries is much higher than at home; 3. prioritarianism attributes more moral value to welfare increases for people who are worse off. One question posed by this paper is whether international and intergenerational justices of beneficiary universality are in conflict with each other. From the great projects discussed, only allowances against starvation have beneficiaries outside the present-day national range in only one dimension: the spatial. The other three projects have beneficiaries in both dimensions discussed here. Their high efficiency originates to a large extent from the fact that at least an important share of their beneficiaries are poor people or badly off for other reasons and that the measures have structural consequences with long lasting beneficial effects for future generations. Therefore, according to this assessment, within this group of measures the possible conflict between the exigencies of international and intergenerational justice is nearly non-existent in practice.

Notes
1 Singer 2011: 87-124.
2 Singer 2011: 142-145.
3 Singer 2011: 145.
4 Singer 1993: ch. 10-11.
5 Partridge 1981.
6 While Singer is a utilitarian, Partridge in his paper mainly defends a – not further qualified – moral requirement to care about the distant future (Partridge 1981: 204). In addition, Partridge, who sees the problem much more from a psychological point of view, provides empirical evidence that self-transcendence is important for everybody but can be obtained by caring for various concerns, including concrete others, even patriotism or religious ideals (Partridge 1981: 208).
7 Welfare ethics define the moral value of some state of affairs p as a function (e.g. the
sum) of all the personal utilities of that p for the single sentient beings. So, for determining the moral value of p we need only to know these personal utilities of p for the various individuals, but no other facts like the time or place of living of the respective subjects. Time and place of living can and do influence the moral value – it usually makes a difference in moral value if poor Julio Alexander from Guatemala or (relatively) rich Bill from the States receives 1000 USD left over somewhere – but only indirectly via the personal utilities of the persons affected – in the example, because Julio Alexander will have a much higher utility from these 1000 USD than Bill – and not because of the place of living counts in itself for the welfare-ethical moral value. This is different e.g. in nationalist ethics, where belonging to a certain nation in itself leads to giving more moral weight to the respective person’s fate.

8 Lumer 1999: section 3.

11 This way to measure efficiency is a bit confusing because a higher value of the cost-welfare relation (i.e. higher costs for the same welfare) means lower efficiency. The inverse relation, i.e. the welfare-cost relation, fits better to the ordinary meaning of “efficiency” because a higher value of the welfare-cost relation (i.e. more moral value for the same investment) now means more efficiency. However, the substance does not change; the same order of preferences is only expressed in a different way, and it is important to keep in mind that lower cost-welfare relations are more efficient, hence preferable.

13 This definition goes beyond Rawls’s (1999) introduction, since it stresses the state’s effectiveness, law-abidingness and devotion to the citizens’ welfare, which excludes self-enrichment, nepotism, corruption, and power vacuums as well as disorganisation.

15 Lumer 2009: 329-333; 338-340. The 1999 price given here has been corrected as described in note 11. The USD/pQALY values have been converted into USD/pQALY values following the method explained in Lumer 2002: 65-71.
16 Lumer 2002: 82.
17 Easterly 2006.
19 Lumer 2002: 81; prices adjusted as explained in note 11.
20 Lumer 2002: 82.
21 Kahneman / Deaton 2010.


References


